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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on electoral reforn1, particularly in regard to the electoral actors, political 
parties, and the desired outcome, a proportionate and accountable government, of our MMP 
electoral system; it attempts to find a balance between principled results and effective 
government. The constitutional role of political parties is discussed, highlighting why it is 
undesirable to leave political parties in the legal wilderness. Particular regard is given to the legal 
status and identity of political parties, the candidate selection processes within parties that serve 
as an electoral bottleneck, and the oversight of parties. A three pronged approach is 
recommended in the reform of parties. Firstf parties must be brought within the public law checks 
and balances that exist for other constitutional actors and must have a distinct and accessible legal 1 ; 
identity. Secondly~ candidate selection processes must be developed to ensure the appropriate 
level of democratic involvement and minimise potential for abuse. Thirdlyj versight of parties 
r-
must be strengthened~ allowing direct sanction of parties for non-compliance with electoral 
rules. The underlying principle of proportionality and the way in which electoral rules affect the 
proportionality of outcomes is discussed. Two specific areas where rules are less than ideal are 
examined, electoral thr:_es_hglds and electoral district /list seat--detennination. It is recommended 
that these rules be modified to ensure that proportionality is not needlessly harmed. Although 
New Zealand has a robust and principled electoral system this paper concludes that complacency 
should be avoided and that we should strive to keep improving electoral principle and practice. 
Word Length: The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography, and appendices) comprises I 5,133 words. 
MMP - Political Parties - Proportionality 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The electoral system is of central interest to anyone concerned with the 
operation of a democratic system of government. Elections are the defining 
moment in a democracy: they perform two fundamental tasks. They confer 
authorisation upon those chosen to represent the electors, and they hold 
representatives to account for their actions while in office. 1 All electoral systems 
seek these goals but prioritise different factors, and provide different methods for 
arriving at a resultant democratic government. 
In New Zealand the Mixed Member Proportional system ("MMP") is 
used to convert votes into seats in Parliament. 2 While the fact of MMP broadly 
describes the exercise of voting, what a vote does, and the look of government, a 
myriad of rules exist to actually implement MMP. Two underlying principles can 
be identified in MMP and must be realised in the rules for an effective MMP 
electoral system; these are the ,accountability and~mection of plurality rule in 
single member electorates with the corrective proportional qualities of a national 
list.3 
The most fundamental underlying principle of MMP is that of 
proportionality. MMP seeks a Parliament that accurately reflects the 
proportionality of votes cast; it seeks to do this by taking a plurality election and 
applying a corrective proportional system to this result. 4 Proportionality is the 
required output of the electoral system under MMP. Proportionality tends to 
create a more truly representative body, and encourages voter participation. 5 
The other underlying principle of MMP is that of accountability and the 
electorate-MP connection. MMP seeks to realise these principles by retaining a 
number of single-member electorates allocated by a plurality vote.6 
1 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin The Concept of Representation (University of California Press, 1967) 38-
59. 
2 
Note that while MMP is referred to as the Additional Member System (AMS) overseas, the tenn 
MMP will be used throughout this paper. 
3 
P Dunleavy and H. Margetts "Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral Reform" ( 1995) 16 
fnternational Political Science Review 9, 27. 
4 
Louis Massicotte and Andre Blais "Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical 
Survey" (1999) 18 Electoral Studies 341,353. 
5 
Robert Richie "Full Representation: The Future of Proportional Election Systems" ( 1998) 87 
National Civic Review 85, 85-87. 
6 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 3 7 and 53-55. 
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Both principles of MMP, proportionality and accountability, tie back into 
the concept of the political party. Parties are recognised as the fundamental actor 
in government and in the electoral system, as it is in reference to parties that 
proportionality is determined. Parties determine who is to be elected through 
endorsing electorate candidates and composing party lists. Parties provide the 
necessary political identity to MPs, and allow the ordinary voter to participate in 
the electoral process. 7 The rules relating to parties must therefore ensure that 
parties are recognised as the constitutional actors they are, and that the principles 
of proportionality, accountability, and connection are not undermined. 
The current rules relating to parties will be examined. These rules must 
ensure effective parties without undermining the democratic principles of MMP 
outlined above. Of particular interest are the rules relating to the regulation of 
parties. Who oversees parties, party decision making processes, transparency of 
parties, and accountability of parties will be examined. At present these rules are 
inadequate, therefore recommendations for reform of the regulation of parties 
will be presented; from changing parties' legal status to recognise their public 
and constitutional role, adding public law checks such as judicial review and the 
Official Information Act 1982, empowering the overseers to effectively monitor 
and sanction parties, and tightening the democratic procedures within parties. 
Rules that relate to the actual allocation of seats will be examined. These 
must produce an outcome that remains true to the principle of proportionality, 
but must not do so to the exclusion of good government. Of particular interest are 
the rules relating to electoral thresholds, which directly influence both parties and 
proportionality, and the rules relating to detennining the makeup of seats in 
Parliament, electorate or list. While thresholds do adversely influence 
proportionality, it is recommended that a middle ground be adopted, to maintain 
effective government. In addition it is recommended that the detennination of 
electorate and list seats be modified to allow growth of Parliament as the number 
of electoral districts increases. 
7 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand 's Constitution in Crisis (John Mcindoe, Dunedin, 1992) 131. 
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Finally the 'party-hopping' phenomenon will be briefly examined, as it 
may be felt by some that the 2005 election will exasperate the effect of party-
hopping on government continuity. The problems in principle and forn1 with 
such legislation will be set out as well as the impact of such legislation on the 
operation of government. It is recommended that party-hopping legislation be 
relegated into the annals of history never to rear its head again. 
The focus of this paper is electoral reform, particularly in regards to the 
underlying actors, parties, and the desired outcome, proportional representation. 
It seeks to examine the often neglected law on parties and recommends the 
establishment of a regulatory regime not only robust and principled but also 
practical. Two specific areas in the operation of MMP, thresholds and electoral 
detennination, where proportionality can be distorted are examiqed. While no 
major changes are recommended here, it is possible to modify the rules in order 
to ensure that the results of elections better represent the underlying principles of 
MMP. 
Throughout, this paper has attempted to balance principle and practical 
reality. It endeavours to strike a balance between rules for the passing hour, 
which may require regular review, and principles for an expanding future, which 
must be of a more enduring nature.8 
II MMP, POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROPORTIONALITY 
A MMP in New Zealand 
New Zealand uses the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system. This 
is a proportional representation system that combines electorate seats allocated 
by a plurality type vote, with a corrective list seat allocation to parties according 
to the proportion of party votes received.9 It is in the allocation of list seats that 
8 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 293. 
9 
For an in-depth description of MMP see Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: 
New Zealand 's Constitution and Government (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 
24-28; for a conceptual analysis of mixed proportional / majoritarian systems and MMP's place 
within such an analysis see Massicotte and Blais, above n 4, 353. 
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disproportionalities arising at the electorate level can be ironed out. 10 Each party 
receives a total number of seats equal to electorate seats plus list seats which 
equal the proportion of party votes received. 11 
It is noted that if an independent candidate or a candidate from a party 
that did not contest the party vote wins any electorate seats, the number of list 
seats to be allocated is decreased by the number of independent seats. 12 The final 
number of MPs will remain the same. 
I Overhang seats and election thresholds 
Overhang seats may occur when a party receives more electorate seats 
than the total seats they are entitled to based upon their party vote. For example 
in the 2005 election the Maori Party won four electorate seats, but only 2.12 per 
cent of the party vote. This created an overhang seat as the Maori Party was 
entitled to a total of only three seats based upon their party vote. 13 Overhang 
seats are retained by the party that won them, the party gains no list seats, and the 
total number of MPs in Parliament is increased by the number of overhang seats 
until the next election. 14 
Underhang seats may also occur when a party is entitled to more list seats, 
as a result of the party vote, than they have candidates on their party list. 
Underhang seats will decrease the total number of MPs in Parliament until the 
next election. This will rarely occur; although perhaps the 99 MP Party who in 
2005 had only two list candidates was hoping to win approximately 20 per cent 
of the party vote in order to create 21 underhang seats, thereby resulting in 99 
MPs. 
A party will not receive any seats unless they meet the election thresholds. 
The thresholds either are five per cent of the party vote or one constituency 
'
0 Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair Representative Government in Modern 
Europe (2 ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995) 279. 
11 For example, a party receiving 50 per cent of the party vote and winning 40 constituencies 
would receive 20 list seats, 60 seats being 50 per cent of total seats in New Zealand's 120 seat 
parliament. 
12 Electoral Act 1993, s 191(8). 
13 See below V[ Appendix One: The Sainte-Lague Method. 
14 Electoral Act 1993, s 192(5). 
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seat. 15 For example a party that receives four per cent of the party vote and no 
constituency seats will receive no seats in Parliament; a party that receives four 
per cent of the party vote and one constituency seat will receive the constituency 
seat won, and in addition any list seats they would be entitled to given their 
. f h 16 proport10n o t e party vote. 
B Proportionality 
Electoral systems based on proportionality seek to ensure a proportionally 
representative result from democratic elections; x percent of votes should be 
represented by x percent in Parliament. In practice this involves ensuring that 
parties in Parliament receive the number of seats that is (approximately) 
proportionate to the percentage of the total vote they received. With 
proportionality, the principle of majority rule is still in effect but the minority 
wins its fair share of representation. 17 
Proportionality is a desirable attribute for an electoral system. 
Proportionality enhances representation; 18 a voter will usually vote for a person 
representing their interests, and these people will often share similar social, 
cultural, ethnic and economic traits. Under a proportional system, these 
'representative representatives' are more likely to be elected in their own right, 
and parties are more likely to place significant groups in favourable positions 
within the party in order to capture the vote of a specific group. 19 Proportionality 
also enhances voter participation; a proportional system ensures that each vote 
equally detennines the result. 20 
Electoral systems have a continuous effect on government behaviour;21 
therefore the underlying principles of the electoral system should be reflected in 
15 Electoral Act 1993, s 191(4). 
16 
In 1999 New Zealand First won 4.26 per cent of the party vote and one constituency seat and 
therefore received four list seats for a total of five seats; Ministry of Justice The General Election 
1999 (May 2000) <www.elections.org.nz> (Last visited 26 September 2005). 
17 Richie, above n 5, 85-87 . 
18 Richie, above n 5, 85-87. 
19 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6; 52. 
20 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 55; Richie, above n 5, 85-87. 
21 Palmer, above n 7, 197-198; Palmer and Palmer, above n 9. 
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the continuing operation of government. Proportionality needs to be recognised 
as a principle that underpins our governmental institutions. 
Proportionality operates in two distinct spheres. The first is on Election 
Day when votes are turned into seats. This may be undermined by poorly crafted 
electoral rules and inadequate regulation of the electoral actors, parties. Secondly, 
proportionality operates within the everyday operation of government. This may 
be threatened by changing the relative proportions within Parliament. 
C The Constitutional Role of Parties 
Political parties play a vital constitutional role in legislative and executive 
government and in elections.22 The current constitutional role of parties will be 
examined. 
I Parties and elections 
Parties are the cornerstone of MMP. It is parties that contest the party 
vote, and it is with reference to parties that the proportionality of Parliament is 
detern1ined; without parties we could not have MMP. Parties are the most visible 
actor in elections: in addition to disseminating party policy platforn1s, and 
forming party lists, individual electorate candidates are identified with parties. 
Often it is the party, rather than the personality, of electorate candidates, that 
determines to whom a voter will give their electorate vote.23 Effective parties are 
therefore essential for maintaining an effective electoral system. 
Parties are the sole gateway into Parliament for all list MPs; they provide 
financial backing, policy platfonns and an identity to electorate candidates. 
Election without party support is unlikely; 1943 was the last time an independent 
22 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 6. 
23 Lange v Atkinson (1998] 3 NZLR 424,463 (CA) Blanchard J. 
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candidate was elected.24 The party candidate selection processes is a bottleneck 
in the process of becoming an electorate or list MP. Candidate selection 
processes therefore need to be fair and accountable to minimise the risk of abuse 
in this crucial electoral step. 
Parties are also important in regard to the rules governing election 
campaigning; rules exist restricting party spending and party broadcasting. 
25 
These rules seek to ensure that well-funded parties do not receive an advantage 
over less prosperous parties.26 The limits on spending are rather high, evidenced 
by the large variations in spending in each election campaign. 
27 
2 Parties in Parliament and government 
Benjamin Disraeli, in 1872, stated:28 
Gentlemen, l am a party man. I believe that, without party, parliamentary 
government is impossible. I look upon parliamentary government as the 
noblest govenunent in the world, and certainly the one most suited to England. 
But without the discipline of political connection, animated by the principle of 
private [honour], l feel certain that a popular assembly would sink before the 
power or the corruption of a minister. Yet, gentlemen, l am not blind to the 
faults of party government. It has one great defect. Party has a tendency to 
warp the intelligence, and there is no minister, however resolved he may be in 
treating a great public question, who does not find some difficulty in 
emancipating himself from the traditionary prejudice on which he has long 
acted. 
This statement showed the importance of parties at all levels of government in 
the Westminster system. Parliament was made up of parties, Parliament 
determined executive government according to parties, and parties influenced the 
24 Electoral Commission General Elections 1890-1993 Seats Won by Party 
<www.elections.org.nz> (last accessed 11 September 2005). 
25 See lll A 2 Regulating parties . 
26 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 190-198. 
27 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (3 ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2004) 
254-255. 
28 Benjamin Disraeli "On the Principles of His Party" (Manchester, April 1872). 
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practice of ministers.29 This was an informal role, based on political necessity, 
but one that was crucial to the operation of government. 
MMP has fonnally institutionalised the role of parties. The electoral 
system now determines the makeup of Parliament based primarily on parties, 
parties in Parliament now negotiate to form executive government comprised of 
a coalition of parties, 30 and party policy still does determine executive 
government policy. The Standing Orders also give formal recognition to 
parliamentary parties. 31 Select committee membership and MP speaking rights 
are allocated to reflect the party composition of Parliament. 32 
Parliamentary party discipline under MMP still incorporates the rules that 
applied under First Past the Post ("FPP"). Most votes still occur along parties 
lines and are whipped votes. 33 Crossing the floor, where an MP votes against 
their party, remains unlikely, although this does seem to have been on the rise 
since the introduction of MMP. Party discipline remains strong and plays a large 
role in the everyday operation of Parliament. 
It is the relationship between parties that detennines whether a bill will 
become law or not. This has become more apparent under MMP as there are 
more parties involved in the legislative process and it is unlikely that one party, 
and less likely that the government as a whole, will be able to ensure passage of a 
bill. 
It is the relationships between parties which determine the formation and 
death of governments, given the much lower likelihood that a single party will 
gain a majority of the seats in Parliament. The chance of a coalition or minority 
government has increased as a party that desires to form a government will either 
29 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 6-7. 
30 As evidenced by MMP's bias away from any one party receiving a majority of parliamentary 
seats and the fact that proportional systems give rise to multi-partism; Carsten Anckar 
"Determinants of Disproportionality and Wasted Votes" (1997) 16 Electoral Studies 501, 501-
502; see also Labour Party and Progressive Coalition "Coalition Agreement between the Labour 
and Progressive Coalition Parties in Parliament" (8 August 2002) Coalition Agreement 
<www.beehive.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005); Labour Party and Alliance "The 
Coalition Agreement between the Labour and Alliance Parties" (6 December 1999) Coalition 
Agreement <www.executive.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005); National Party and 
New Zealand First "The Coalition Agreement" ( I O December I 996) Coalition Agreement 
<www.executive.govt.nz> (last accessed 28 September 2005). 
31 House of Representatives Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (2004) 
<www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed 8 July 2005) order 34. 
32 House of Representatives, above n 31, orders 103 and 187. 
33 Palmer, above n 7, 14 I -143. 
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need to bring other parties in as coalition partners, secure other parties' support 
on matters of confidence and supply, or a combination of both, in order to ensure 
the confidence of the House. 34 
The process of forming a government has been commented on by 
Governor-General Sir Michael Hardie Boys (as he then was), who stated that:
35 
l. The formation of government is a political decision and must be 
arrived at by politicians. 
2. My task as Governor-General is to ascertain where the support of 
the House lies. In an unclear situation, that might require me to 
communicate with the leaders of all the parties represented in 
Parliament. 
3. Once political parties have reached an adequate accommodation, 
and a government is able to be forn1ed or confirmed, the parties 
could be expected to make that clear by appropriate public 
announcements of their intentions. At that point it might be 
necessary for me to talk with some party leaders. I would then 
expect to have sufficient infornrntion to be able to appoint a new 
Prime Minister, if that were required. 
This emphasises that the formation of government is up to negotiation between 
parties in Parliament. The death of governments is also determined by the 
relationship between parties. 
Parties are the fundamental actors in executive government. With MMP, 
and the proportionality it brings, the formation of government is usually going to 
follow the majority of the vote. Because the nature of government formation, 
even under MMP, involves excluding some parties from government, just 
because all voters are represented fairly in Parliament does not mean that all 
voters are represented fairly in the exercise of executive power. This is a 
necessary result of a parliamentary system, and is not something that can, or 
should, be changed; such change would come at the cost of effective 
34 
See Labour Party and Progressive Coalition, above n 30;Labour Party and Alliance, above n 30; 
National Party and New Zealand First, above n 30. 
35 
Sir Michael Hardies Boys "Continuity and Change: the 1996 General Election and the Role of 
the Governor-General" ( I 997) 5 Waikato Law Review I, 9; these rules are set out in the Cabinet 
Manual; see Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) paras 4.35 - 4.43. 
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government. 36 This does highlight the limits of proportional representation; it 
only applies to Parliament and legislative government, not executive government. 
Ill REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
Party importance has increased under MMP. Most obviously parties are 
now a formal actor in our government, and play the major role in elections. 
While this was true under FPP, that system rested upon the fiction that parties did 
not really exist and the only actors in elections, Parliament, and government were 
individual MPs. 37 
Most importantly proportionality is based on the proportion of the total 
party vote that each party receives at an election. List seats are only available to 
members of parties. Party lists, and therefore the potential candidates for list 
seats, are determined following 'democratic procedures' by each party.38 Given 
that party lists are 'closed lists' which the voting public cannot influence or 
change if they disagree with the makeup or ordering of the list, the party has 
huge control over who may be elected as an MP. 
A Existing Party Law 
Parties have an ephemeral status within our legal system. Before MMP, 
parties existed solely within the sphere of private law, and the public role of 
parties was ignored.39 However, in reality parliamentary government was party 
government, and had been for some time.40 
MMP, based as it is on the proportionality of parties in Parliament, 
somewhat ameliorates this fiction. Our electoral law does now mention parties 
and provides some rules regarding them. 41 However, even though parties have 
36 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 24 and 57. 
37 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 13 and 265. 
38 Electoral Act 1993, s 71. 
39 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 265 . 
40 Disraeli , above n 28. 
41 See particularly Part 4 of the Electoral Act 1993; Electoral Act 1993, s 62-71B. 
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become the key actor in elections and government, they still sit largely outside 
the public law. 
1 Legal status of parties 
. . 4,, Tl 
Parties are voluntary, essentially private orgamsatlons. - 1ey may or 
may not be incorporated, 43 although most are not. 
44 
This private nature was 
stated in the decision of Peters v Collinge,45 and has been tacitly confinned in 
Awatere Huata v Prebble. 46 The private nature of parties has important 
consequences for the accountability and transparency of parties. 
As an unincorporated society, a party has no separate legal identity from 
its members; it is comprised of a network of personal relationships, governed by 
contract, between members, and therefore only exists while there are members.
47 
Parties cannot own property, enter into a contract, or be sued. The majority of the 
public, and most members of parties, would consider that parties are separate 
entities and therefore deal with parties in such a way.
48 However, if things go 
wrong, nothing exists with which to attach liability; the party does not exist as a 
legal entity. Members of the party executive cannot bind general party members 
in contract, so general party members are not accountable. The members of the 
party executive may be liable in contract, if they personally entered into the 
42 The fact that this does not square with the actual position of parties is discussed by the Royal 
Commission; Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 267. 
43 Note that many parties have various branches or associated organisations incorporated, while 
the party itself remains unincorporated. Associated organisations are usually set up to deal with 
the party's property; this makes sense as it creates a distinct legal entity to deal with property 
without having to rely on the (potentially) transient party membership. Branches are incorporated 
because, unlike the core party, branch membership is a lot more transient and incorporating a 
branch will grant some stability. 
44 The only parliamentary party that is incorporated is the Green Party; see Green Party 
"Constitution and Rules of the Greens, the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand Incorporated" 
(5 June 2004). 
45 Peters v Collinge [ 1993] 2 NZLR 554, 566 and 575 (HC) Fisher J. 
46 Awatere Huata v Prebble [2005] 1 NZLR 289,309 (SC) Elias CJ. 
47 Teresa Somes "The Legal Status of Political Parties" in Marian Simms (ed) The Paradox of 
Parties (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1997) 175; Peters v Collinge, above n 45, 566. 
48 This phenomenon exists with all voluntary organisations, including political parties. 
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contract, or liable in tort, if they have committed some wrong, but are not liable 
by virtue of their status as party executive members.49 
Peters v Collinge was a case brought by the Rt Hon Winston Peters 
challenging a decision of the National Party in expelling Peters, attempting to 
restrict him standing for Parliament if not selected as a National candidate, and 
not approving Peters as the Tauranga National candidate. 50 The major issue 
became whether National 's decision to disapprove Peters for the Tauranga 
electorate was subject to judicial review, and whether wider party political 
processes were reviewable. 
Fisher J found that the jurisdiction to review steps taken by 
unincorporated societies was through contract, the terms of the contract being the 
rules of the society that members agreed to follow when becoming members. 
There may be, in special situations, non-contractual judicial review where the 
society is exercising 'quasi-public functions', or when there was a 'significant 
direct impact upon the public', but this was not one of those cases. Therefore, it 
was the express and implied terms of National's rules that were relevant to the 
case; the validity of the rules themselves could not be examined. 
Parties' decisions are therefore only reviewable on whether the party 
rules were followed, unless the decision is a matter of significant and direct 
impact upon the public. 51 If the selection of a candidate to have party backing to 
stand for election is without impact on the public, it is hard to identify any party 
action that would be. 
The fiction of government being comprised of individual MPs is also 
evident in Peters v Collinge, where it is stated that parties are legally private 
bodies, and as such have no public duties. 52 A party merely assists individuals 
into becoming MPs and offers support and 'suggestions' to MPs from the wings. 
49 For the legal status of unincorporated societies generally, including liability issues, see 
Campbell v Scott [ l 995] 2 NZLR 345, 355-356 (HC) Tipping J. 
50 Peters v Collinge, above n 45. 
51 Peters v Collinge, above n 45, 566-571. 
52 Contrast with the decisions in Dunne and Anderton v Canwest TVWorks limited (l l August 
2005) C[V 2005 495 1596, paras 31-36 Ronald Young J where the changing law relating to 
review is summarised as being a move toward ' bodies who perform public functions', rather than 
the nature of the body; see also Ransfield v Radio Network Ltd [2004] BCL which states that in 
the context of New Zealand Bill of Rights Act l 990, private bodies can be required to adhere to 
the rights contained in the Act if they are performing a public function. ft is at least arguable that 
candidate selection would be considered a public function under the test in Ransfield. 
15 
Individual MPs may have public or statutory duties by virtue of their status as an 
MP. 53 While MMP has, since this case was decided, put parties on the 'public 
stage ' , the public and statutory duties of a party would not extend to situations 
beyond what the individual MPs' duties were, and as such would not cover the 
internal workings and decision making processes of the party. 
The way that the arguments were structured and the relief that was sought 
effectively would have forced the National Party into approving Peters as the 
candidate for Tauranga. The observation that parties are private entities, and that 
private law relating to private unincorporated societies and public law relating to 
elections must be kept separate, was an efficient and (relatively) non-contentious 
way to deny this remedy to Peters. If the Court had decided parties were public 
bodies, their decisions were able to be reviewed, and that the particular decision 
in the case was illegal, Fisher J would have had little choice but . to effectively 
force National into giving Peters the Tauranga nomination. The Court would 
appear to be deciding who could have a realistic chance of entering Parliament 
by being a major party candidate. This perception likely would have occurred 
despite the result being based upon the validity of the party's internal decision 
making processes independent from whomever or whatever the decision is being 
made about; this perception could have influenced the Court into observing 
parties' private nature. 
In Awatere Huata v Prebble the principle that parties were not subject to 
public duties was restated. It was observed that a court would enforce a party's 
rules, but that a party had wide freedom to determine their internal arrangements, 
objectives and membership.54 The fiction that parties do not have a role in public 
politics has continued even after the change to MMP. 
Incorporated societies must comply with the Incorporated Societies Act 
1908. They are distinct legal entities in the form of bodies corporate, with the 
powers and functions of bodies corporate, such as ownership of property, the 
ability to contract and to be sued_ss This creates an entity easily accessible in a 
dispute; rather than having to sue a member of the party executive who 
53 Peters v Collinge, above n 45, 575. 
54 Awatere Huata v Prebble, above n 46, 309. 
55 Incorporated Societies Act 1908, s 10. 
16 
participated in the decision making process, the party itself can be sued. Wider 
party members are not personally liable for the society.56 
Incorporated societies have financial reporting obligations, which include 
reporting income, expenditure, assets, liabilities, and securities.57 These are more 
detailed than the annual disclosure of donations and the election expense returns 
parties must make. 58 Parties that are incorporated are therefore slightly more 
transparent in regards to finances, and are directly accessible and accountable in 
disputes. 
However, it is likely that the observations from Peters v Colf inge and 
Awatere Huata v Prebble would apply to incorporated parties. Internal 
arrangements are still governed by society rules; there are no additional 
requirements that would affect the internal workings of the party. Judicial review 
of incorporated societies occurs in the same way as review of companies 
according to their constitutions, meaning that parties can be held to comply with 
their rules, but the validity of those rules cannot be examined. 59 Parties have no 
public duties in ordering their internal arrangements just because they are 
incorporated. 
2 Regulating parties 
The Electoral Act 1993 contains a party registration regime. Parties that 
register may submit party lists and contest the party vote.60 The Act contains no 
definition of a party. Therefore any organisation meeting the registration 
requirements may register as a political party. The registration criteria are that 
the organisation must have at least 500 financial members, and the party's name 
and logo must not mislead or cause confusion.61 
Beyond these requirements, which provide a minimum size and 
sufficiently serious political intent before an organisation may register as a 
56 lncorporated Societies Act 1908, s I 3. 
57 Incorporated Societies Act I 908, s 23. 
58 Electoral Act 1993, ss 2 I 4C and 2 I 4G. 
59 See Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1999) 3 NZLR 1, 12. 
60 See Electoral Act 1993, ss 62-71 B, especially s 62: parties do not have to register to contest 
electorate seats. 
61 Electoral Act I 993, s 63. 
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party,62 there exists little regulation. Financial restrictions on campaign spending 
exist; exceeding the limits may attract a fine or imprisonment to the person 
responsible, but there is no sanction for the party itself.
63 Additionally registered 
parties must declare all donations over $10,000 that they receive, 
64 
although such 
declarations may be from anonymous third parties, and are recorded as such, 
65 
or 
may be funnelled through a trust to stop disclosure of the donor. In 1999 only 
four donations above $50,000 were not made either anonymously or through a 
trust.66 
The candidate selection processes within parties must be democratic.
67 
This requirement does not affect the registration of a party, so a party with 
undemocratic procedures for candidate selection may still register and remain 
registered as a party. Democratic processes must involve participation by all 
financial members of the party, or participation by delegates selected by those 
members. 68 This in practice differs markedly between parties, with varying 
degrees of participation and influence afforded to party members. 
The candidate selection process is arguably the most important function 
undertaken by parties; it essentially detern1ines the makeup of Parliament. Party 
lists are closed lists, so that the general voting public has no influence on the 
makeup, or ranking, of the list. It is essential that these processes be regulated to 
ensure suitability for such a vital step in elections, and transparent to minimise 
potential abuse. 
Regulation of the actual selection process is rather scarce. First, section 
71 does not specify what participation means, so while party members may 
participate they may have no actual influence. Secondly, there is no sanction for 
registered parties that have undemocratic selection processes. They remain 
registered, and there appears to be no power for the Electoral Commission to 
62 Andrew Geddis and Caroline Morris "All is Changed, Changed Utterly? - The Causes and 
Consequences of New Zealand's Adoption of MMP" (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 451 461. 
~ , 
A party may spend $1,000,000 plus $20,000 for each candidate; Electoral Act 1993, ss 
2148(2)(a) and 224. 
64 Electoral Act 1993, s 214G. 
65 Electoral Act 1993, s 214G(l)(a)(ii). 
66 Justice and Electoral Committee "Inquiry into the 1999 General Election" [ 1999-2002] AJHR 
I7c 100. 
67 Electoral Act 1993, s 71. 
68 Electoral Act 1993, s 71. 
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sanction or censure an infringing party, or even review the selection processes.69 
The procedures are likely to be reviewable in court; although this has not 
happened in New Zealand it has occurred in Australia. 70 
It is parties who are allocated advertising time and money under the 
Broadcasting Act 1989. 71 It is illegal for parties to purchase additional 
broadcasting time. 72 Breach of this is punishable by up to a$ l 00,000 fine for the 
person who commits the offence.73 
Broadcasting time and money is only available to registered parties. 74 
When deciding on the allocation to be made to each party the Electoral 
Commission, with a representative from the government and opposition 
parliamentary parties, must have regard to: 75 
• The vote received at the previous election by a party; 
• The number of MPs a party has; 
• Relationships that may exist between parties, which would 
cover statements of intent as to post election coalitions or 
supply; 
• Public support, including op11110n polls and party 
membership; and 
• The need to provide a fair opportunity to registered parties to 
convey their policies to the public. 
The Electoral Commission's role and the effect of these considerations in the 
allocation of broadcasting time and money will be discussed below. 76 
69 See Electoral Act 1993, ss 5 and 6. 
7° Clarke v Australian labour Party ( 1999) 74 SASR I 09; Geddis and Morris, above n 62, 462 ; 
Andrew Geddis "The Unsettled Legal Status of Political Parties in New Zealand" (2005) 3 
NZJPIL 105, 117. 
71 Broadcasting Act 1989, ss 71, 73, 74, 74A and 748. 
72 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 70. 
73 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 280. 
74 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75( I). 
75 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(2). 
76 See lll B I Broadcasting Allocation. 
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The Electoral Act has established a regulation regime for parties. This 
revolves around registration of parties; essentially any organisation that meets the 
minimal size and seriousness requirements may become a political party. From 
this base of registration the regulation of campaign spending and broadcasting, 
financial disclosure of donations, and candidate selection requirements flow. 
These are essentially the steps that were recommended by the Royal Commission, 
although the registration thresholds have been increased slightly. 
B The Electoral Commission 
The Electoral Commission is an independent body established under the 
Electoral Act. 77 It was created in 1994 to deal with the registration of parties, and 
has responsibility for the allocation of broadcasting time and money. 
78 
It is one 
of four agencies that administer the electoral system. 
79 The functions of the 
commission are to:80 
• Register parties and their logos; 
• Supervise the disclosure of donations to parties by parties; 
• Allocate broadcasting time and money to parties for election 
campaigns m conjunction with representatives from 
parliamentary parties; 
• Supervise a party's filing of party campaign expenses; 
• Promote public awareness of electoral matters; and 
• Consider and report on electoral matters referred to it by 
Parliament or the Minister of Justice. 
These functions mean that the effective role of the Electoral Commission is in 
public education, electoral research, registering parties, and ensuring party 
compliance with the Electoral Act 1993 and Broadcasting Act 1989. 
77 Electoral Act 1993, ss 4-15. 
78 Ministry of Justice "Report of the Election Framework Taskforce" (Wellington, June 2001) 3. 
79 The others being the Chief Electoral Officer, the Electoral Enrolment Office, and the 
Representation Commission. 
80 Electoral Act 1993, s 5. 
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However, there are gaps in the Commission's coverage of the electoral 
rules relating to parties. For example the requirement that candidate selection be 
democratic is not covered, although the Royal Commission did recommend that 
the Electoral Commission be able to review selection rules and determine 
whether they are appropriate. 81 Also, the Commission has limited powers to 
impose sanctions on wayward parties; it must report to the police any conduct 
believed to be an infringement of the election expense and financial reporting 
requirements,82 but this relates only to the person who breached the rules, not the 
party as a whole. 
The Royal Commission recommended that the Electoral Commission be 
able to audit any party to ensure compliance with the financial reporting 
requirements. 83 While parties must currently appoint auditors to oversee the 
validity of election expense reports, and auditors must advise the Electoral 
Commission when it seems that the requirements have been breached or the party 
has interfered with the audit,84 the Commission itself does not have the ability to 
carry out its own investigation. 
I Broadcasting allocation 
A maJor role of the Electoral Commission is the allocation of 
broadcasting time and money. 85 It undertakes this role with two representatives: 
one representing the government, and one representing the opposition 
parliamentary parties. 86 There are clear criteria the expanded Commission must 
consider when making allocations. 87 
This is an important function as much of the public gain the majority of 
their knowledge of parties through television and radio. Allowing a party to 
present its view without the gloss of editorial influence is important. This reason 
81 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 240-241; the Electoral Commission's 
decision could be appealed to the High Court. 
82 Electoral Act 1993, ss 214C(6) and 2141. 
83 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 200. 
84 Electoral Act 1993, ss 2 I 4D and 214E. 
85 Electoral Act 1993, s 5(ba). 
86 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(1). 
87 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(2). 
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speaks as to why party broadcasting must be made available to all parties and 
why it must be restricted so as to not give certain parties unfair advantages. 
The current process of broadcasting allocation is not ideal. Firstly, 
representatives of Parliamentary parties participate in the allocation of 
broadcasting. Secondly, the allocation criteria include the votes a party received 
at the last election and the number of MPs a party has in the current Parliament. 
Both of these factors favour parties who are established and in Parliament 
already, with the bigger parties receiving more than the smaller parliamentary 
parties, who receive more than the parties outside Parliament. For the 2005 
general election, money for broadcasting was allocated as follows:
88 
Table l: 2005 party broadcasting allocations 
Group [ Party \ Allocation per ·[ Allocation per 
: Party : Group 
1 [ Labour Party : 1,100,000 : 1,100,000 _i _______ Tii~ti;-~~-1-i>~rty ________________________ T90-6:0-60---------------:·-9oo)ioo ____________ _ 
----------T).:cf,-- 6~~~;;~:- tii -Ff;~t,-- u~ft~~f T _________________________ : _______________________ _ 
3 : Future : 206,607 : 826,428 
' ' ___________ , ____________________________________________ _, __________________________ .. _______________________ _ 
4 : Maori Party : 129,129 : 129,129 
-----------'-------------------------------------------- -·--------------------------'------ -- -----------------
5 ( Progressive j 77,478 j 77,478 
----------T-Affi~~~~: ----c~-i~-t-i~,~ ----ii~;ft-~g~,-T- ------------------------: ------------------------
6 j Destiny NZ, Libertarianz · 20 661 : 82,644 
- - - - - - - - - - -,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7 
: 99 MP Party, Democrats, NZ : 
j FRPP, Republic Party of NZ [ 10,330 j 41,320 
As can be seen the two maJor parties, Labour and National, received 
considerably more allocation then all the other parties, a total of $2 million. This 
was due to the votes in the 2002 general election, the number of MPs, opinion 
polls and membership of the party. These factors were all also used to justify 
$200,000 more to Labour than National. The remaining parliamentary parties 
received almost $1. l million, distributed between seven parties. The parties 
outside Parliament received slightly over $120,000, distributed over eight parties. 
The differentiation between the Parliamentary parties (groups three, four, and 
five) was based on the results of the 2002 election and the number of MPs. The 
88 Electoral Commission "Election Advertising Funds Re-Jigged as New Parties Fail to Stand 
Lists" (26 August 2005) Press Release <www.elections.org.nz>. 
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differentiation between non-Parliamentary parties was based solely on opinion 
poll results, the group six parties having received over 0.5 percent in a poll 
during the preceding year. 89 The allocation considerations therefore help to 
entrench dominant large parties who already have a popular support base. 
The Electoral Commission is the primary body responsible for overseeing 
parties. It does, however, seem to be crippled by inadequate powers to ensure 
party compliance. The Electoral Commission also plays an important role in 
electoral administration in general. Since the Royal Commission report there 
have been several inquiries advocating the consolidation of electoral 
administration into a single entity, the Electoral Commission. 90 However, the 
government line, for the most part has been, 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it,' or the 
issue has been put off until a full inquiry into the electoral system can be 
undertaken in the future. 91 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake 
a review of electoral administration in general, such a consolidation would be 
beneficial to the administration of parties as the Electoral Commission would 
gain critical mass in order to effectively carry out its functions. 92 
C Party Reform 
There are plenty of options for party reform. Tightening up the rules 
relating to parties would ensure that as the primary actor in elections, parties 
were both transparent and accountable for their constitutionally important role. 
Three areas exist where reform would be most effective. First, the status of 
parties needs to be changed to recognise the fact that they are public actors; this 
would increase both transparency and accountability. Secondly, the rules relating 
to democratic procedures for candidate selection can be improved; this would 
help to remove a potential bottleneck in political representation and ensure that 
no oligarchy within parties controls access to Parliament. Thirdly, oversight of 
89 Electoral Commission "Decision of the Electoral Commission on Allocation of Time and 
Money to Political Parties for Broadcasting of Election Programmes for the 2005 General 
Election" (15 April 2005) Press Release <www.elections.org.nz>. 
90 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 66, 124-126; Ministry of Justice, above n 78, 17-22. 
91 Palmer and Palmer, above n 9, 32-34. 
92 Ministry of Justice, above n 78, 21-22. 
23 
parties can be improved by extending the scope of functions of the Electoral 
Commission and allowing the Electoral Commission to enforce electoral rules 
directly against parties. 
1 Regulating legal status 
Currently, parties are treated as essentially private organisations; they 
have no public duties, and are not accountable under public law. Parties are 
usually unincorporated and therefore do not have a legal identity separate from 
party membership.93 Refonn, to ensure accountability and transparency of parties, 
should therefore be made by changing the status of parties to public and creating 
a distinct legal identity. This would enable public law checks and balances, and 
ensure accessibility and accountability when things go wrong. 
The status of parties was determined in Peters v Collinge. 94 This was 
decided before the transition to MMP. Parties' private status has been tacitly 
confirmed in Awatere Huata v Prebble, a decision delivered during the third 
MMP term.95 These decisions do not describe the actual reality of parties. As has 
been shown parties perform constitutionally important roles at all levels of 
government, 96 from determining whom may be elected and disseminating 
political information, to forming and dissolving governments, to determining the 
passage of legislation and government policy. 
To ensure effective, transparent, and democratic elections and 
government, we need to ensure that parties operate effectively, transparently, and 
democratically. 97 Parties presently operate effectively; most have very 
streamlined decision making processes with a clear group in control. 
Transparency has been improved with the donation reporting requirements and 
campaign spending restrictions that accompanied the introduction of MMP. 
Beyond this, transparency and democracy in party decision making is often 
93 See Ill A l Legal status of parties. 
94 Peters v Collinge, above n 45. 
95 Awatere Huata v Prebble, above n 46, 309. 
96 See II C The Constitutional Role of Parties. 
97 Geddis, above n 70, l l 0. 
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obfuscated behind committees and party executives with wide undefined powers, 
and pseudo-inclusive party direction and policy making processes that are subject 
to veto by a small party elite. In reforming the law relating to parties we need to 
ensure that transparent and democratic operation is maximised without 
derogating from effective party operation. 
It is simple to recognise the public status of parties. The insertion of a 
provision in the Electoral Act l 993 would likely suffice. 98 This could be 
modelled on an equivalent German provision, which provides: 99 
(I) Political parties fonn a constitutionally integral part of a free and 
democratic system of government. Their free and continuous participation in 
the forniation of the political will of the people enables them to discharge the 
public tasks which are incumbent upon them pursuant to the [constitution] and 
which they undertake to fulfil to the best of their ability. 
(2) The parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the 
people in all fields of public life, in particular by: 
• bringing their influence to bear on the shaping of public opinion; 
inspiring and furthering political education; 
• promoting an active participation by individual citizens in political 
life; training talented people to assume public responsibilities ; 
• participating in Federal, Land and Local Government elections by 
nominating candidates; 
• exerc1s111g an influence on political trends 111 parliament and the 
government; 
• initiating their defined political aims in the national decision-making 
processes; and 
• ensuring continuous, vital links between the people and the public 
authorities. 
This provision simply states that parties do have a vital constitutional role 
in democratic government, and sets out the broad public duties that parties have. 
Such a provision would bring the entire ambit of party activity into the public 
sphere. 
98 Clarke v Australian labour Party, above n 70. 
99 Poltical Parties Act (Gesetz Uber die politischen Parteien), article I (Gennany). 
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By giving parties a public status, public law checks and balances would 
apply, 100 successfully boosting transparency and accountability in decision 
making processes without harming the effectiveness of the party system. These 
checks include public law judicial review of party decision making, the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, '0 ' and the Official Information Act 1982. 
Judicial review is a judicial invention to ensure that decisions by the 
executive or a public body are made according to law, even if a decision does not 
otherwise involve an actionable wrong. 102 Judicial review applies to all public 
bodies. Parties are arguably acting as public bodies in their constitutional 
functions; 103 however, this argument has been hampered by decisions stating that 
parties are not public. 104 It would be simple to clearly allow judicial review of 
parties by affirming their public status in statute. 
The ground of judicial review most appropriate to rev1ewmg parties 
decision making process would be courts' innominate ground of review, where 
intervention takes place when something has gone wrong of a nature and degree 
that requires court intervention. 105 This ground gives more flexibility to review of 
non-governmental organisations where the decision to be reviewed does not fit 
cleanly within one of the traditional review grounds. 106 
Judicial review of party decision making processes would ensure that 
decisions complied with the Electoral Act 1993. This is particularly relevant in 
relation to the requirement for democratic candidate selection in section 71. 
Review would also ensure natural justice was followed in decision making: this 
enhances transparency and would ensure that party interests triumphed over any 
personal biases. 107 Judicial review does not harm effective parties because the 
remedies do not impose substantive obligations on parties. Rather, judicial 
10° Clarke v Australian Labour Party, above n 70, 129-130 and 137-139. 
101 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3(b ). 
102 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385, 388. 
103 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps, above n 59, 11. 
104 Peters v Collinge, above n 45; Awatere Huata v Prebble, above n 46, 309. 
105 Electoral Commission v Cameron [ 1997] 2 NZLR 421, 430 (CA). 
106 The traditional grounds are illegality (exceeding power granted by statute), irresponsibility (a 
breach of natural justice or procedural fairness), and irrationality (a decision that no reasonable 
decision maker would ever have made); see Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the 
Civil Service [1985] l AC 374, 410-411. 
107 Contrast with the modest standard of fairness required by the court in Peters v Collinge, above 
n 45, 568-569. 
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review advises only on proper decision making procedures, and the final 
substantive decision always rests with the party. Judicial review would ensure 
legal, fair and rational decisions by parties without compromising their role in 
the political process. 
Recognising parties' public status would bring them under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The public activities undertaken by parties 
would be covered by section 3(b) according to the test in Ransfield v Radio 
Network Ltd, if their public status was recognised. 108 
The most pertinent right relating to parties is the right to natural justice. 109 
This right guarantees judicial review of decisions, and will ensure procedural 
fairness in decision making. Freedom from discrimination is important, 
particularly for the candidate selection process, and may help to ensure truly 
representative candidates.' ' 0 However, the prohibited grounds of discrimination 
include political opinion. 111 Political opinion, and discrimination based on that 
opm10n, is essential to the operation of effective parties, who require unique 
political stances to be effective. There are no exceptions for parties within 
section 19 to avoid this requirement, and section five is inapplicable unless the 
limit was proscribed by law. 112 Discrimination on political opinion by parties 
should be authorised by statute. 
Section 12 provides for electoral rights and that everyone over the age of 
18 is qualified for membership in the House of Representatives. This would be 
unlikely to affect parties.' 13 It is relevant to party conduct as it reinforces the idea 
that parties cannot prevent anyone, including members and putative candidates, 
from standing as a candidate against the party. 114 However, the fact that someone 
is qualified does not mean that a party must, for instance, select them as a 
candidate. Qualified only means that everyone has the opportunity to become a 
108 Ransfield v Radio Network Ltd, above n 52. 
109 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 27. 
110 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 19. 
111 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21 ( I )(j). 
112 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 19 and 5. 
113 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 12. 
114 The idea that such restriction was not possible was tentatively mentioned in Peters v Collinge, 
above n 45, 565. 
27 
member of the House. Any other interpretation, for instance one that was used to 
attempt to force a party nomination, would make this provision unworkable. 115 
As famously stated by the United States' Justice Brandeis, "[p]ublicity is 
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said 
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." 116 To 
that end the Official Information Act 1982 should be extended to cover parties. 
This could be achieved by amending schedule one of the Official Information 
Act, to state that the organisations subject to the Act include registered parties. 
All registered parties would then be subject to the information disclosure 
requirements of the Act. 
Parties would, rather than being able to operate in effective secrecy as 
they presently do, be subject to public scrutiny when infonnation was requested 
unless good reason existed to withhold the infonnation. 117 Much information 
contained by parties that is currently secret, like party finances, would therefore 
be available on request. However, things that should be kept secret, such as 
names and address of members, and party policy, can remain secret. 118 Such a 
change would not damage party effectiveness because sensitive infonnation will 
be able to be kept secret, but other information that sheds light on the workings 
and influences of parties would be available; this would dramatically increase 
party transparency. 
As well as recognition of the public nature of parties, it would be 
beneficial to create distinct party legal identities. This may be achieved through 
mandatory incorporation under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, 119 which 
would be simple to implement. Mandatory incorporation would involve making 
115 Peters v Collinge, above n 45, 565 . 
116 Louis D Brandeis Other People 's Money and How the Banker 's Use It (R Adams, AM Kelly, 
New York, 1971) cited in Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 187. 
117 Official Information Act 1982, s 5. 
118 
For names and addresses of party members, this would come under s 9(2)(a) privacy of 
persons. Party policy would come under s 9(2)(k) preventing the disclosure or use of official 
information for improper gain or improper advantage; Official Information Act 1982, ss 6, 7 & 9. 
119 Another option, adopted in Germany, would be to create a distinct party identity that 
automatically applies to any organisation who meets certain requirements: see Political Parties 
Act, above n 99, arts 2 and 3. Such a system seems superfluous when a legal framework that 
achieves the same goals already exists under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, and would 
involve uncertainty as to when an organisation became a political party and thereby complicate 
dealings with such organisations. 
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it a requirement that a party that wishes to register be an incorporated society. 
Such a goal could be achieved by requiring that applications for registration 
include evidence of incorporation. 120 Registration should be cancelled if a party 
becomes unincorporated, 121 and parties should be required to state in their annual 
d 1 . h h . . d )'J 'J ec arations t at t ey remain incorporate . --
The benefits of requiring incorporation as a condition of registration 
includes parties with distinct and stable legal identities, the ability for parties to 
enter contracts and own property, the ability to sue and enforce judgment against 
parties, as well as more detailed and full financial reporting requirements than 
those currently required. There are few other consequences due to incorporation 
for parties; the greatest cost is in the additional financial reporting requirements 
and these are hardly onerous. Mandatory incorporation would therefore make all 
registered parties significantly more accountable and would increase 
transparency without impacting on the effectiveness of parties. 
2 Improved democratic procedures for candidate selection 
An essential way to maintain effective and democratic parties is through 
regulating the way that candidates are selected and party lists are created; parties 
must be democratic and also seen to be democratic. 123 While presently the 
Electoral Act requires democratic candidate selection processes, the actual 
processes vary wildly between parties. There are therefore two goals for reform 
in this area. First, standardising the rules for candidate selection; secondly, 
improving the democratic input into selection. 
The common theme running through all parties' selection procedures is 
that the final decision making process rests with a small group, usually the party 
executive. There are different levels of input that ordinary party members have 
into the selection process. Input ranges from direct election and ranking of 
120 See Electoral Act 1993, s 63(2). 
121 For instance, a phrase to the effect that "the Electoral Commission shall cancel the registration 
of any political party on being satisfied that the party is no longer incorporated" could be 
included ins 70 of the Electoral Act 1993. 
122 See Electoral Act 1993, s 71A. 
123 Hon Peter Dunne MP (19 December 1992) 532 NZPD 13173. 
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candidates, to nomination of candidates, to selection of delegates who make the 
decision. 124 
Standardising selection processes would be beneficial. This would put 
every party and all party members on the same footing. Standardisation would 
allow a consideration of what is appropriate in democratic candidate selection to 
occur and ensure that those standards are met. Presently, what is considered 
important is different for each party; merely specifying that provision be made 
for member participation does not adequately regulate the process. 
(a) Democratic selection process 
What therefore should candidate selection processes involve? Democratic 
involvement by party members has already been identified as the core 
consideration. 125 The level of involvement, however, must be determined. The 
Royal Commission recognised the tension between party executive and ordinary 
member selection of candidates. It was recognised that party executives had a 
beneficial effect on the overall quality and representation of candidates, but that 
under an MMP system parties would be solely responsible for choosing 50 per 
cent of Parliament, given 50 per cent of list seats filled from party lists, and it 
would be wrong to concentrate such a great influence on the makeup of 
Parliament in the hands of a relative few. 126 
So while democratic involvement in candidate selection is very important, 
it should be set at such a level as to ensure high quality candidates and high 
representation; too much democratic input may compromise quality candidates to 
populist candidates and undermine adequate diversity of representation, too little 
input would create a democratic deficit in deciding who is to be considered for 
election. Parties have approached this tension in two main ways; either by 
indicative votes from party members, or selection by directly elected delegates. 
Both methods have problems. An indicative vote does not restrain the 
party executive from just making up their mind and selecting their favoured 
124 See VIII Appendix Three: Selected Party Constitutions. 
125 Electoral Act 1993, s 71; Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 240. 
126 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 240-241. 
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candidates without reference to the indicative vote. The delegate method does not 
actually allow the wider party to even express their support for potential 
candidates, but does at least make the ultimate selectors accountable to the party. 
While the particular method of candidate selection should be left up to 
parties, as each party will have different considerations it desires to emphasise in 
the selection process, a number of requirements can be imposed to stress the 
ideally 'democratic' nature of selection. First, an indicative vote by the wider 
party should occur; this allows the wider party to express their views as to who 
should be elected. Secondly, criteria for departure from an indicative vote should 
be promulgated before such a vote occurs; these criteria should be decided by the 
party and designed to represent the values of the party. Thirdly, when the 
indicative vote is departed from reasons should be given by the party executive 
and these reasons should conform to the already promulgated departure criteria. 
These requirements will ensure that candidate selection is not controlled by a 
small group within a party. They will ensure transparent and rational selection 
processes, while still allowing the party to select effective and representative 
candidates. 
German law requires that candidate selection occur by secret ballot by 
party members. 127 However, this is less desirable than the open and transparent 
indicative vote method suggested; a binding secret ballot prioritises democratic 
procedures to the exclusion of quality control. 
(b) Party lists 
Party lists are essential for MMP; it is from these lists that the extra MPs 
that the party vote entitles parties to are drawn. List selection needs to ensure that 
these seats, that can only be filled by party candidates, do not undermine the 
proportionality or accountability of Parliament. The list selection procedures may 
be improved by either retaining closed lists and improving the 'democratic 
procedures', or switching to open lists. 
127 Political Parties Act, above n 99, art 17. 
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Closed lists mean that the party itself determines the list membership and 
order. 128 The current methods of detennining lists range from the Green Party, 
who allows all financial members to directly vote for the membership and order 
of the list, 129 to parties that seem to 'democratically determine' the composition 
of the list based solely upon the votes of the dominant party personalities. 130 
List selection suffers from the same problems as candidate selection, in 
that cuiTently too much power rests with a small group within the party. Even the 
Greens' method allows modification based on ensuring the list is representative 
of the New Zealand population; this may be representative but not democratic. 
The minor 'cult of personality' parties make barely a show of democratic 
selection. All parties to some degree retain the power to influence lists with a 
small elite within the party. 
The indicative method described above would remedy the problems in the 
list selection and ranking procedures; party members would be required to rank 
candidates in order of preference, and this would result in an indicative list vote. 
Open lists are where the voter while selecting a list at the election can 
indicate their preference for the order, or alternatively the make-up of the list. 
This has the benefit of eliminating the democratic deficit that occurs with closed 
lists as every person, not just those who belong to a party, have an equal say both 
in who is elected and who can be chosen to be elected. 
Open lists are nevertheless less desirable than closed 'democratic' lists. 
Open lists bring with them much added complexity; a voter must do more than 
choose a party and electoral candidate they like, they must also consider the 
order they would like candidates to be elected, and possibly whether there 1s 
anyone else they would like. 
Complexity is undesirable and would be increased even if the voter only 
had the option of re-ranking candidates. The act of voting would become similar 
128 Electoral Act I 993, s 127(2). 
129 
However this may be modified slightly in a committee phase; see Green Party, above n 44. 
130 
See United Future "Constitution of United Future New Zealand" (September 2004); ACT 
New Zealand "Constitution and Rules of ACT New Zealand" ( 16 March 2002); these parties 
require 'weight' to be given to indicative votes and comments by the wider party, but do not in 
any other way restrict the Party Executive. 
32 
to single transferable voting, although the allocation of seats would remam 
different. Increased complexity leads to increased informal voting. 131 
Write-in candidates, where the voter may nominate a person not on the 
ballot for election, would increase the complexity of voting again. If write-in 
candidates had to register before the election, this method of voting is 
superfluous. However, if anyone can be nominated, the likelihood of a write-in 
candidate having any significant effect on the election is minimal. 
While support for open lists does exist, it is by no means unanimous. 132 
Also practical considerations exist that favour the retention of closed lists. These 
are that: 133 
• National closed lists enable parties to ensure balanced 
representation among its candidates; 
• Open lists may mean competition within a party as 
candidates seek to be placed higher on the list than other 
b f h · 134 mem ers o t eir party; 
• To be effective open lists would require that every voter have 
a large degree of knowledge about all the candidates; and 
• Open lists bring added complexity in voting. 
Candidate selection processes within parties are an important bottleneck 
in the electoral process. Therefore these processes must be democratic, but not 
compromise the electoral process, effective parties or effective government. 
Candidate selection in general should proceed upon open and fair lines, with 
wider party members having an indicative input into the selection process. 
131 Canadian Parliamentary Research Branch Electoral Systems: Background Paper (May 1993) 
20: informal votes are those that are unable to be counted by not clearly expressing the voters 
intent. However, it is not agreed that complexity necessarily increases infonnal voting: see Enid 
Lakeman How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems (Faber and Faber, London, l 974). 
132 Nine (compared to l l who supported the status quo) of 2 l submissions to the MMP Review 
Committee desired open lists, as did the United Party; MMP Review Committee "Inquiry into the 
Review ofMMP" [2001] AJHR 123A 52. 
133 MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 51-52; Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 
above n 6, 68. 
134 It was on the bas is that such competition in public was undesirable that it was stated that such 
competition should occur within party forums; Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 
above n 6, 68. 
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Closed lists should be retained to maintain effective parties, government, and 
elections. 
3 A nelV and improved Electoral Commission 
The Electoral Commission is the appropriate overseer of parties. It 
maintains the register of parties, and already supervises the registration and 
financial reporting requirements for parties. However, the Commission's powers 
should be expanded. 
The allocation of broadcasting time and money should continue to be 
based on the current criteria. However, other considerations should also be 
allowed; presently the Commission is unable to consider wider issues. Such other 
issues could include: 135 
• The number of electorate and list candidates a party intends 
nominating; 
• The time made available by broadcasters and the amount of 
money appropriated by Parliament; 
• Any relevant matters raised in consultation with parties and 
broadcasters; 
• The length of a party's existence; 
• The scope of its policies and activity, so a single-issue party 
should receive a smaller allocation than parties with a full 
range of po) icies; 
• The geographical spread of a party; and 
• The exclusion of parties with little chance of success or 
without serious political intent. 
Such considerations could be given a lower priority than the current 
'primary' considerations of past electoral perfonnance. 136 Allowing wider 
considerations would move the focus from the past electoral success of parties, to 
135 Electoral Commission "Submission to the Electoral Law Committee on the 1nquiry into the 
1999 General Election". 
136 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(2); see also Electoral Law Committee "Broadcasting (Election 
Broadcasting) Amendment Bill" [ I 996-99] LXVI AJHR [24. 
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the future benefits parties would receive from allocation. This would help 
mitigate the entrenchment that large well-established parties have. 
The representatives of Parliamentary parties on the Commission for 
broadcasting allocation should be removed. This would ensure that the allocation 
decisions remain independent, and appear to be independent, from any party and 
1. b. 137 par 1amentary 1as. 
The Commission should be given a role in ensuring compliance with the 
democratic candidate selection procedures within parties. 138 This was advocated 
for by the Royal Commission, with the possibility of High Court review of 
Commission decisions. 139 The Commission's role was removed at the select 
committee stage as it was thought more appropriate that oversight of this process 
rests with the courts. 140 The Commission should, however, have a role in 
reviewing selection rules. First, a review by the Commission would be less 
expensive, onerous and time consuming than taking a review case to court; this 
could be important in the time pressures that are involved in elections. Secondly, 
as parties are required to lodge copies of their rules with the Commission in order 
to register, the Commission has easy access to the rules and is well positioned to 
examine them. Thirdly, if the democratic selection criteria are changed as 
recommended, 141 it is a relatively simple task to check for compliance. Fourthly, 
if the Commission's powers are extend to allow direct sanctioning or censure of 
parties for breach of electoral rules, the Commission is the logical place to 
impose all sanctions and give censure. 
Responsibility for oversight of party adherence to the requirements in the 
Incorporated Societies Act should also rest with the Commission. The 
Commission should be allowed the powers of inspection in the Incorporated 
137 Palmer and Palmer, above n 9, 31. The Electoral Commission itself has submitted that these 
representatives be removed; see Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 66, 116; Justice and 
Electoral Committee "[nquiry into the 2002 General Election" (2002-2005] AJHR (7 A 17; MMP 
Review Committee, above n 132, 56-57. 
138 These procedures are located in section 71 of the Electoral Act 1993. For the recommended 
changes to s 71, see Ill C 2 lmproved democratic procedures for candidate selection. 
139 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 240-241. 
140 Electoral Law Committee "Report on the Electoral Reform Bill" [ 1991-93] XX[V AJHR ll 7C 
7. 
141 See III C 2 Improved democratic procedures for candidate selection. 
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Societies Act, 142 and required to seek liquidation of an incorporated party when it 
1 l , . 143 no onger meets t 1e act s requirements. 
The donation reporting regime should be tightened up. Presently, given 
the possibility of anonymous donations, the regime does not meet the purposes 
for which the donation disclosure regime was established, namely to reduce 
improper influence, and promote transparency, accountability, and public 
confidence. 144 This could be improved by changing the definition of 'anonymous 
donation' to a donation received by someone who is actually unknown to the 
party, and by requiring that 'associated entities' (any organisation that is 
controlled by, or operates to the benefit of, a registered party) make disclosure of 
donations on the same basis as parties. 145 The Commission should have the 
ability to sanction non-compliant organisations. 
The Commission should have the ability to sanction wayward parties. 
Presently, the Commission can recommend to the police that individuals who 
breach the financial reporting and election expense provisions be charged with 
corrupt or illegal practice. Sanctions should be available against parties directly, 
which would be possible if mandatory incorporation was instituted. 146 If a party, 
for example, exceeds the election expense restrictions, that party should be liable 
for illegal practice. 
Sanctions against parties should include deregistration. Although the 
Royal Commission considered that party deregistration was too draconian and 
impractical, 147 given the constitutional importance of parties and the need to 
ensure compliance with electoral rules to ensure an effective electoral system and 
democracy, such sanction should be available. 148 Deregistration should not be 
made lightly, and should only be made when a party wilfully refuses to comply 
with electoral rules, particularly when a party loses incorporated society status or 
fails to remedy undemocratic selection procedures. The first action taken by the 
142 lncorporated Societies Act l 908, s 34A. 
143 lncorporated Societies Act l 908, ss 25 and 26. 
144 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 137, 22-23. 
145 Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 66, 101-102. 
146 See III C 1 Regulating legal status. 
147 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 267. 
148 
Note that the Commission already can cancel registration if it becomes satisfied that party 
membership has fallen below 500; Electoral Act 1993, s 70(2). 
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Commission when a party has breached electoral rules should be censure of the 
party. This allows the party to remedy the deficiency themselves. Parties must be 
given notice of potential deregistration, and may object to deregistration. 149 
4 Recommendations 
In order to maintain effective parties and boost their transparency and 
accountability, improve the democratic processes within parties, and improve 
oversight of parties and sanctions for nefarious party behaviour, a number of 
changes should be made to our electoral law. These may be difficult to 
implement, given that parties will inevitably see some of these recommendations 
as adverse to their interests, and because parties have an effective stranglehold on 
the legislative process. 
Changes that will enhance transparency and accountability of parties 
generally are: 150 
• Electoral Act 1993: adding a prov1s10n that recognises the 
constitutional and public status of parties; 
• Electoral Act 1993: requiring applications for registration to 
include evidence of incorporation and that registered parties 
· · d 151 d remain incorporate ; an 
• Official Infom1ation Act 1982: amending the first schedule to 
make registered parties subject to the Act. 152 
Closed lists should be retained, but the 'democratic selection procedures' 
for electorate and list candidates should be improved. Recommended changes to 
section 71 of the Electoral Act 1993 are to require: 153 
149 
Compare with the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), ss 137 and 141; Australian 
Electoral Commission Party Registration Overview <www.aec.gov.au> (last accessed 19 
September 2005). 
150 See III C 1 Regulating legal status. 
15 1 
These could be included in ss 63 and 70 of the Electoral Act 1993. 
152 Official Information Act I 982, sch l. 
153 
See lll C 2 Improved democratic procedures for candidate selection . 
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) 
• An indicative vote by all party members; 
• A clear set of criteria for when the party executive / delegates 
may depart from an indicative vote that is promulgated 
before such voting; and 
• That reasons be given for departure from an indicative vote. 
Changes to the Electoral Commission that should be implemented 
through the Electoral Act l 993 are: 154 
• Removing the two parliamentary party representatives from 
the Commission for purposes of allocating broadcasting time 
and money; 
• Allowing oversight of the section 71 democratic ·candidate 
selection procedures, with an appeal to the High Court; 
• Giving the Commission responsibility for oversight of party 
compliance with all facets of the Electoral Act l 993 and the 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 ( assuming mandatory 
incorporation is adopted); 
• Allowing the imposition of sanctions directly against parties 
(assuming mandatory incorporation is adopted); and 
• Allowing deregistration of parties for continued and cynical 
breaches of electoral rules after notice and an opportunity to 
object is given to the party. 
IV MAINTAINING PROPORTIONALITY 
New Zealand under MMP has an extraordinary record of proportionality. 
Proportionality has been improving with every election since the introduction of 
MMP. 
155 
There are, however, a number of challenges which may have an 
adverse effect on proportionality. As the underlying principle of MMP is 
proportionality, and proportional representation is the desired outcome of an 
154 
See Ill C 3 A new and improved Electoral Commission . 
155 
See Vfl Appendix Two: The Gallagher Index of Disproportionality. 
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MMP election, these challenges should be resolved. Proportionality must be 
balanced against ensuring a functioning and effective system of government. 
There are two types of challenges that face proportionality. First, 
challenges caused by the operation of the rules of MMP which distort 
proportionality as seats are allocated; these are caused by electoral thresholds, 
detem1ination of electorate seats, and overhang seats. Secondly, challenges 
within the operation of Parliament, most obviously party-hopping; this distorts 
proportionality during the tenn of Parliament. 
A Disproportionality in Seat Allocation 
The rules relating to when a party is entitled to 'top-up' list seats on the 
basis of their party vote ("electoral thresholds"), and the rules for determining 
electoral districts, can have a significant impact on the proportionality of 
Parliament. These rules relate to how seats are allocated: electoral thresholds 
determine when a party may receive list seats, and the determination of electoral 
districts affects the ratio of electorate to list seats and therefore what seats are 
available. 
Electoral thresholds have an immediate effect on proportionality and 
parties in that if a party fails to meet a threshold, they do not receive any seats 
and the votes they did receive are effectively wasted. Detennining electoral 
districts is a long tem1 threat to proportionality. It does not affect parties directly, 
but as time passes, will eventually benefit the major parties more, as they win 
l h . · 156 more e ectorate seats t an mmor parties. 
While other rules of MMP may be exploited to allow manipulation of 
proportionality, for instance the use of decoy lists, 157 these have not had a 
significant impact in New Zealand, and are best addressed though political 
sanction, rather than changing the rules relating to MMP. Such exploitation of 
156 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 66. 
157 This is somewhat ameliorated in New Zealand given the rules relating to component parties, 
however detem1ined parties may still get around these rules if they are willing to accept the risk 
of a public backlash given the cynical exploitation of rules; Electoral Act 1993, ss 63(2)( d), 
127(3A), 128A, and 191. The use of decoy lists has been successful overseas, particularly in Italy 
in 2001; see Yll Appendix Two: The Gallagher Index of Disproportionality. 
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' 
I 
rules, rather than issues with the rules themselves, have therefore not been 
examined. 
I Electoral thresholds 
Electoral thresholds limit the parties that receive seats in Parliament to 
those that gain over five percent of the total party vote ("the vote threshold"), or 
an electorate seat ("the electorate threshold"). 158 Thresholds are designed to 
discourage the proliferation of minor or extremist parties in Parliament; too many 
disparate and whimsical minor parties can disrupt the passage of legislation and 
make confidence and supply uncertain. 159 With no threshold parties would gain a 
seat at around 14,000 votes; with the five percent vote threshold, a party needs 
approximately 100,000 votes. 160 
Thresholds affect both the proportionality of Parliament, and the 
Parliamentary existence of otherwise viable parties. 161 For instance a party that 
received 90,000 party votes (under five per cent) and no electorate seat would 
receive no seats; 162 these 90,000 votes have no effect in the makeup of 
Parliament; those voters have effectively been disenfranchised. 163 In 1996 7.5 per 
cent of party votes was given to parties that did not meet the thresholds, in 1999 
six per cent, in 2002 4.9 per cent, and in 2005 1.3 per cent. 164 In each MMP 
election a significant number of votes have been wasted. Thresholds also 
influence voting behaviour; voters may be discouraged from voting for a party 
who is on a threshold borderline. 165 
A balance must be struck between effective government and 
proportionality. The potential for disruption to government is actually quite 
158 Electoral Act 1993, s 191(4). 
159 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 66-67. 
160 
In 2005 the Destiny Party would have gained a seat at 0.62 per cent (14,210 votes) of the party 
vote with no threshold; see VIII Appendix Three: Election Results and Thresholds; statistics 
taken from Electoral Commission Election Results <www.electionresults.govt.nz> and 
<www.elections.org.nz> (last accessed 21 September 2005). 
161 Anckar, above n 30, 510. 
162 
The Christian Coalition in 1996 received 4.3 percent of the party vote, which was 
~£pro~imately 90,0~0 and di~ not receive any seats; MMP_ Review Committee, above n 132, 48. 
Rem Taagepera Nat1onw1de Threshold of Representation" (2002) 21 Electoral Studies 383. 
164 Electoral Commission, above n 160. 
165 
Anckar, above n 30, 504, and 505-506; Kieran Williams "Judicial Review of Electoral 
Thresholds in Germany, Russia, and the Czech Republic" (2005) 4 Election Law Journal 191, 
191-192. 
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considerable. 166 In 2002 having no election thresholds would have significantly 
shifted the balance of power post election; the minority Labour-Progressive 
government would have had to secure at least one more party on confidence and 
supply in order to be sure of retaining the ability to govern. 
It is therefore a case of weighing the importance of effective government 
against a proportional result with minimal wasted votes. No thresholds create too 
much risk of a 'hung house', and are not appropriate. 167 Two questions remain. 
First, what level should the vote threshold be? Secondly, should the electorate 
threshold remain as another path to Parliament? 
New Zealand has a high vote threshold at five per cent. 168 The Royal 
Commission recommended a threshold of four per cent; this was seen as an 
appropriate level to maintain effective government without being the obstacle to 
emerging parties that a five per cent threshold would be. 169 In the 2001 MMP 
review, several arguments were raised for reducing the threshold to four per cent. 
These were less discouragement of emerging parties, reduction in wasted votes 
(this is significant, for in three of the four MMP elections the number of wasted 
votes has been above 100,000), and mitigation of the 'jackpot effect'. The 
jackpot effect is where 4.9 per cent = no seats, but 5.1 per cent = six or seven 
seats. Voting behaviour as a result may be distorted, both in key electorates (such 
as Wellington Central in 1996 and 1999) and even for the party vote, as has 
happened in New Zealand and Gennany. A lower vote threshold would 
ameliorate the jackpot effect and distortions to voting patterns. 170 
While a four percent threshold, combined with the electorate threshold, 
would not have changed anything in the last three elections, this is not a valid 
reason for keeping the status quo. 171 The threshold should be set as low as 
possible without undermining effective government; a four percent threshold 
166 See Y!II Appendix Three: Election Results and Thresholds. 
167 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 66; MMP Review Committee, above n 
132, 48. 
168 Compare to two per cent in Denmark, 1.5 per cent in Israel, four per cent in Norway and 
Sweden, and five per cent in Germany; MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 49. 
169 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 66-67; the ACT, Green, and United 
parties (admittedly all parties that have a vested interest in a lower vote threshold) agreed with 
this, see MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 48. 
170 MMP Review Committee, above 162, 48-49. 
171 This essentially was the argument from those parties who desired retaining the status quo. A 
four per cent threshold would have affected the 1996 election, since the Christian Coalition 
received 4.3 per cent and therefore would have gained five seats: MMP Review Committee, 
above n 132, 48-49. 
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would not undennine effective government but may be important to mmor 
parties, and would mitigate the adverse effects of a high threshold, while still 
erring on the side of caution. 
The electorate threshold represents another path to representation for 
small parties that may not be able to gamer the support to cross the vote 
threshold. However, it has attracted opposition from all but parliamentary parties 
with electorate seats. Arguments against the electorate threshold are that it is 
unfair and anomalous in allowing list MPs to enter Parliament on the 'coat-tails' 
of another MP rather than on the basis of party support, and that success in an 
electorate is not necessary evidence of support elsewhere.
172 However, taking the 
view that as most electorate MPs are elected based upon their party affiliation 
anyway, 173 winning in an electorate seat is justified in allowing the allocation of 
list seats, as by winning an electorate seat there exists significant local party 
support that may otherwise be ignored.
174 Additionally the electorate threshold 
d 'd 175 oes avo1 vote wastage. 
The effect of the electorate threshold on the allocation of seats is much 
more significant than changing the vote threshold.
176 Several minor parties have 
relatively safe electorate seats and depended on the electorate threshold to gain 
list seats, in 2005 four parties were in this position. More importantly, as a 
consequence of eliminating the electorate threshold, electorate seats gained when 
a party does not reach the vote threshold would become overhang seats; 
177 this 
further distorts proportionality. 
178 Therefore while the electorate threshold may 
be seen to be anomalous in principle, by allowing MPs from a national party list 
to enter Parliament based on the merits of an individual MP, the effect of 
removing this threshold would exasperate vote wastage, the jackpot effect, 
disproportionality, and discourage regional representation; the electorate 
threshold also has a significant positive effect on proportionality. 
179 The 
electorate threshold should remain given the serious adverse effects on 
172 Palmer and Palmer, above n 9, 25-27. 
173 Lange v Atkinson, above n 23,463. 
174 MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 50. 
175 MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 50. 
176 See Vlll Appendix Three: Election Results and Thresholds. 
177 See Electoral Act l 993, s 19 l. 
178 See VIII Appendix Three: Election Results and Thresholds. 
179 See VIII Appendix Three: Election Results and Thresholds. 
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proportionality and possible proliferation of overhang seats that would occur if 
removed. 
2 Declining proportionality and overhang seats 
The operation of electoral rules creates a situation of declining 
proportionality over time. This is due to the method of determining electoral 
districts in relation to the population of the South Island, and the fixed number of 
total MPs. 180 
Electoral districts are detem1ined by taking the population of the South 
Island and dividing by 16. This gives the size of each electoral district ("the 
quota"). North Island and Maori electoral districts are detennined by taking the 
population on the general roll in the North Island and on the Maori roll and 
dividing by the quota. 181 
As the North Island and Maori population increases faster than the South 
Island population the number of electoral districts will increase. In 1996 there 
were a total of 66 electoral districts; 182 in 2001 a total of 69. 183 Population 
estimates from June 2004 show that there would be at least one more North 
Island or Maori district if districts were recalculated at that time. 184 
As electoral districts and therefore electorate MPs increase, the amount of 
list MPs decreases, as the total number of MPs is limited to 120. 185 There is no 
proportionality in the allocation of electorate seats: they are awarded by plurality 
180 Electoral Act 1993, ss 35, 36 and 191. 
181 For example in 2001, when the electoral districts were last redrawn, the populations were 
868,923 (South Island), 2,497,596 (North Island), and 371,690 (Maori). This gave an electoral 
district size of 54,308 (868,923 + 16), 46 North Island districts (2,497,596 + 54,308), and 7 Maori 
districts (371,690 --:-- 54,308), for a total of 69 electoral districts; see Electoral Act 1993, ss 35 & 
36. 
182 45 North Island, 5 Maori, and 16 South Island. 
183 46 North Island, 7 Maori, and 16 South Island. 
184 Total North Island adult population (including population on the Maori roll) had increased by 
143,000 compared to total South Island adult population (including population on the Maori roll) 
by 37,000, therefore if electoral districts were redrawn in June 2004, given district size of under 
60,000 and an increase of 106,000 more in the North Island then South Island, at least one, 
possibly two or three, more North Island / Maori electoral districts would be required depending 
on the exact numbers on the Maori roll; Statistics New Zealand National Population Estimates 
(June 2004 Quarter) <www.stats.govt.nz> (last accessed 23 September 2005). 
185 Electoral Act l 993, s 19 l; MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 17-18 and 38. 
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votes. It is list seat allocation that establishes proportionality.
186 
As the ratio of 
electorate to list seats increase, the likelihood of overhang seats increases.
187 
This problem can be remedied by either cementing the number of 
electorates or increasing the total number of MPs. Of the two options increasing 
the number of MPs is the more preferable, even with public opposition to 
increasing MPs; 188 as section 35 is entrenched it will be difficult in practice to 
alter the method of creating electoral districts, 189 and cementing the number of 
electorates will result in larger and larger electorates as time passes, diminishing 
the electorate-MP link. The Royal Commission thought the least amount of MPs 
needed for effective government was 120, and preferred 140; 
190 the report also 
stated that under MMP, as the number of electorates increased, the size of the 
House should increase. The ideal ratio of electorate seats to list seats was 
determined to be l: l; other ratios were able to maintain proportionality to an 
extent, however, these were rejected on the basis of causing different classes, and 
a lower diversity, of MPs. 191 
The current method of determining electoral districts should be retained, 
but section 191 should be modified to allocate an equal number of list seats to the 
number of electorate seats. 
B Disproportionality During Parliament 
Party-hopping refers to the phenomenon where an MP elected as a list or 
electorate candidate of one party, during the term of Parliament, switches to 
another party. This distorts proportionality as the original party now has one less 
seat than it was entitled to on Election Day. 
186 Gallagher, Laver and Mair, above n 10, 279. 
187 Electoral Act 1993, s 192(5); MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 17-18 and 38. 
188 A number of popular campaigns have sought a reduction of MPs, usually to 99. However 
while these have attracted popular support, considered opinion, and submissions made on the 
issue, general favour retaining the status quo or increasing the number of MPs; MMP Review 
Committee, above n 132, 34-40; Phillip Joseph "Constitutional Law" [2001] 4 NZLR 449, 469-
470. 
189 Electoral Act 1993, s 268. The total number of MPs is not so entrenched; see Electoral Act 
1993, s 191. 
190 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 126-129; see also Ministry of Justice, 
above n 78, 34-38. 
191 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 65-66. 
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Party-hopping has occurred a number of times in New Zealand, both pre-
(notably the Rt Hon Winston Peters and the Rt Hon Jim Anderton) and post-
MMP. The party-hops of Alamein Kopu in 1997 and part of the New Zealand 
First caucus in 1998 caused concern about the effect of party-hops on Parliament 
and government. 192 This prompted a legislative response, the Electoral (Integrity) 
Amendment Act 2001 ("The Integrity Act"). 
After the Integrity Act had passed, the Alliance party fractured. Anderton 
was the 'parliamentary leader' of Alliance, but formed a new party to contest the 
upcoming election. The Integrity Act proved ineffective. 
In 2002 Donna Awatere Huata was suspended from ACT and became an 
independent. ACT attempted to invoke the Integrity Act, by stating that Huata 
was distorting the proportionality of Parliament. 193 ACT contended that because 
Huata was no longer an ACT member, the party had less parliamentary strength 
than entitled to, thereby distorting proportionality. Huata claimed she still voted 
according to ACT policies. The Integrity Act was eventually successfully 
invoked to remove Huata from Parliament. 
1 The Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 
Concern has been that party-hoppers deny voters their desired result. 
Particular concern has been on list MPs, considered to be elected solely by 
reason of the party since shunned. The Integrity Act was passed to address this 
perceived problem. The intent was to stop MPs leaving their parties or 'distorting 
the proportionality of Parliament' and remaining in Parliament. 194 The Act was 
only triggered when the MP themselves, or the parliamentary leader, notified the 
Speaker. 195 When triggered a list MP was replaced by the next person down on 
the list, and an electorate MP forced a by-election in that constituency. 196 The 
A h · d 197 et as now expire . 
192 Palmer and Palmer, above n 9, 140 - 141. 
193 Electoral Act 1993, s 55D ( expired). 
194 Electoral Act 1993, ss 55A, 558, SSC, and 550 (expired). 
195 Electoral Act 1993, s 55A ( expired). 
196 Electoral Act 1993, ss 134 and 129. 
197 Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 200 I, s 3. 
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The Act was designed with the idea that because we have a proportional 
electoral system our Parliament should be proportionate to the election result. 
Proportionality is undem1ined whenever an MP switches parties. This reduces 
the effectiveness that party should have based on the party vote. MPs should 
therefore not be able to switch parties and remain in Parliament. 
New Zealand 1s umque 111 toying with fixing election-night 
proportionality by preventing party-hopping. Germany, as well as other non-
MMP proportional systems, have never implemented such restrictions. 198 Party-
hopping in New Zealand does, because of the smaller size of Parliament, 
influence proportionality more than in overseas jurisdictions. 
Party-hopping legislation may become relevant aga111 111 the current 
Parliament; parties are finely balanced, some appear unstable,. and defections by 
one or two MPs may cause the government to collapse. Party-hopping legislation 
may be the only prevention of such a dilemma; although whether prevention is 
desirable must be questioned. 
Effective party-hopping legislation must be able to maintain 
proportionality; the Integrity Act was less than successful in this regard, due to 
problems in form. Any such legislation also has problems in principle, and 
undesirable consequences. 
(a) Problems in form 
Party-hopping legislation simply does not work when it is intended to 
work. Legislation may not cover many of the situations of actual party-hopping; 
the Integrity Act was restricted to two narrow circumstances, the resignation of 
an MP and when an MP (who is not the parliamentary leader) acts in such a way 
as to distort the proportionality of Parliament. 199 
Even when activated the Integrity Act entrusted the formal power to 
determine whether a seat has become vacant to the Speaker. The Speaker is not 
198 For example both Poland and Israel (pure proportional representation) have had some trouble 
with party-hopping but have not implemented any such measure. 
199 Electoral Act 1993, ss 55A, 55C, and 558 (expired): see particularly the discussion regarding 
Anderton's 2002 party-hop. As Anderton was both the parliamentary leader and the resigning MP 
the Integrity Act could not be invoked against him. 
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the appropriate person to exercise this power. Because of the role of the Speaker 
this fomrnl ly entrenches the power to determine the disqualification of MPs with 
Parliament; given that Parliament is a partisan environment this is not 
appropriate. 200 
The Integrity Act is also inconsistent in regards to electorate and list MPs. 
If after an electorate MP party-hops, a candidate not from the party that 
originally held the seat wins the by-election, proportionality will be affected. The 
number of list MPs the original party would have received if they had won the 
same party vote but not the constituency will be one greater than what they 
actually received, and if the MP has jumped to a rival party that party will have 
one too many MPs. 201 
(b) Problems in principle 
The principles behind the Act are also of concern. Such legislation 
derogates from the principle that MPs are elected to exercise their own 
judgement, and are not 'obedient messengers to the electorate or any other man', 
including parties.202 Additionally the problems that the Act was meant to address 
are political concerns and should not be dealt with by the blunt instrument of 
legislation. Before the Integrity Act was passed, party-hopping often resolved 
itself with the next election.203 Also, party-hopping may be appropriate in some 
circumstances; for example, party-hopping was endorsed at the following 
election by the electorate in Anderton's case. Legislation automatically bans 
party-hopping even when the defecting MP may be the one who is adhering to 
party-principles and it is the party that has strayed.204 
200 See generally Claudia Geiringer "Judging the Politicians: A case for Judicial Detem1ination of 
Disputes over the Membership of the House of Representatives" (2005) 3 NZJPlL 131. 
201 Phillip Joseph "Constitutional Law" [2000) NZLR 30 I, 311. 
202 Edmond Burke "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (Bristol, 3 November 1774). 
203 As Alamein Kopu MP, and the New Zealand First party-hoppers failing to get re-elected. 
204 Palmer and Palmer, above n 9, 141; Phillip Joseph "Mrs Kopu's Challenge to MMP" [ 1997) 
NZLJ 413, 414; Joseph, above n 20 I, 3 I 0-311. 
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( c) The effects of fixing proportionality 
Fixing proportionality has an effect on legislative and executive 
government. Strong party discipline combined with party-hopping legislation 
means that Parliament effectively losses the role of individual MPs. Fixing 
proportionality creates a formalistic Parliament: a Bill goes in one end, and 
depending on the numbers and parties will come out ( or not) at the other; party 
numbers are detennined on election night, and will remain unchanged for the 
intervening three years. 
The benefits of fixing proportionality are that voters can be sure of what 
is going to happen in Parliament. The individual idiosyncrasies of MPs will not 
affect the legislative process. The maintenance of proportionality also assumes 
greater importance with the acknowledgement that parties have become the 
fundamental actors in our political process. 
Fixing proportionality has a significant effect on executive government. 
New Zealand has a parliamentary democracy. The major advantage of 
parliamentary democracy is the flexibility of executive government; the 
government is responsible to Parliament and may be removed by it. The major 
disadvantage is the lack of clear separation of powers between legislative and 
executive government. 205 
Fixing proportionality destroys the flexibility of government without 
increasing the separation of powers. In a majority government if proportionality 
is fixed the government will rarely fall. It would be equivalent to government 
under FPP, without the ability of individual MPs to defect. Therefore with 
majority governments fixing proportionality leaves less flexibility than we had 
under FPP. Even majority coalition governments will seldom fall given that the 
minor party as a whole must leave the government. 
205 This can be contrasted with the presidential system which is inflexible - the president is unable 
to be removed for the entire length of a defined term - yet has fantastic separation of powers: 
Alan Siaroff "Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies" (2003) 
24 International Political Science Review 445, 446-447. 
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In minority governments flexibility will also be reduced. It will not matter 
what MPs think, only what the relationship between parties are. Relationships 
between parties change only under severe circumstances, whereas enough 
individual MPs may atrophy and cause the downfall of a minority government. 
Minor parties are particularly sensitive to causing trouble and would be unwilling 
to jeopardise their popularity with the electorate by causing a government to fall, 
however, many MPs as individuals thrive on such controversy and this does not 
tarnish the party as a whole. 
While fixing proportionality gives certainty to the legislative process, it is 
clearly undesirable in relation to the executive. The reduction in flexibility 
caused by fixing proportionality is a serious threat to the most important check 
on executive government. MMP has given us, a parliamentary democracy that is 
truly flexible and able to potentially bring down rogue governments. By fixing 
proportionality at a relatively arbitrary date once every three years,206 we lose 
perhaps the most important benefit of MMP. 
C Maintaining Proportionality 
New Zealand under MMP has had a consistently minimal level of 
disproportionality. 207 This is due to a relatively robust system of turning votes 
into seats. We have an optimal-size constituency for the return of list seats, a 
constituency that covers the entire country.2°8 Presently, the ratio of electorate to 
list seats is able to maintain the proportionality of Parliament and minimise the 
risk of overhang seats. While the ability for the system to maintain 
proportionality will decline as the population changes, it is still Qust) within the 
recommended margins of the Royal Commission. 209 Also while electoral 
206 Voter opinion would certainly not support the election night proportionality throughout the 
entire tenn. 
207 See Vll Appendix Two: The Gallagher [ndex of Disproportionality, particularly Table 3: 
Disproportionality in New Zealand elections ( 1990 - 2005), and Table 4: Disproportionality in 
recent elections worldwide. 
208 See for example the effect that multiple multi-member constituencies have had on 
proportionality in Scotland; VII Appendix Two: The Gallagher [ndex of Disproportionality. 
209 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 65-66. 
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thresholds have pushed disproportionality up, given that New Zealanders still 
vote largely for established parties, 210 few votes have been wasted due to the 
thresholds. Parties too have contributed to this good result, and the Kiwi 
philosophy of 'fair-play' has come across in the conduct of elections. Although 
parties may snipe and attempt to discredit each other, no party has manipulated 
the rules to their advantage. 
It would be a shame to allow this outstanding level of proportionality to 
fall prey to neglect. Therefore the two areas where the rules have been identified 
as less than ideal should be changed before they begin to present a problem. The 
first of these is in relation to electoral thresholds. Electoral thresholds do play an 
important role in preventing the proliferation of minor or extremist parties and 
the subsequent degradation in the stability and continuity of government. 
However, setting these thresholds too high results in disproportionality and 
discouragement of emerging parties. The vote threshold should be lowered to the 
Royal Commission's recommended four per cent. Although this would not have 
changed the results of last three elections at all, it is important to allow minor 
parties the added chance of representation that four per cent, which is still a 
conservative threshold, gives. In addition proper consideration should be given to 
even lower thresholds, as four per cent is still rather high. A two per cent vote 
threshold would seem to be effective: it does not allow the myriad of additional 
minor parties that no threshold at all would allow, but does allow parties that are 
sufficiently large to win seats, and is a popular threshold overseas.211 
An alternative to basing the vote threshold on a percentage of the total 
vote would be to require parties to receive a number of votes equal to the 
electoral district quota, approximately the size of an electorate. 212 This would 
have the advantage of not changing the actual number of votes required 
2 10 
In 2005 approximately 80 per cent of the vote was received by Labour or National (86 per cent 
if the top three parties, Labour, National , and New Zealand First, are considered); in 2002 this 
was over 60 per cent (73 per cent if the top three parties, Labour, National, and New Zealand 
First, are considered); in 1999 this was 69 per cent (77 per cent if the top three parties, Labour, 
National, and Alliance, are considered). 
2 11 See IX Appendix Four: Election Results and Thresholds, in particular Table 7: Thresholds and 
the I 999 election. In 1999 this would have allowed the Christian Heritage party who received 
almost 50,000 votes (2.4 per cent of the party vote) to receive 3 seats, but would have prevented 
the Future and Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis parties, who would have received seats if no 
thresholds existed, from receiving seats. 
212 
Electoral Act l 993, s 35(3)(b ); presently this is 54,308, and is equivalent to approximately 
2.38 per cent (in 2005) to 3 per cent (in 2002) of the total party vote. 
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depending on election day voter turnout, and is a logical number: if a party can 
gain seats in Parliament based on a plurity of votes within an electorate, a party 
who receives votes equivalent to an entire electorate should be entitled to receive 
seats. 
The electorate threshold should be retained. While some feel that it is 
unprincipled, it has a positive effect on the maintenance of proportionality, 
reduces the otherwise large chance of overhang seats, minimises vote wastage, 
and recognises significant local support. 
The second set of rules that should be modified are those relating to the 
setting of electoral districts and list seats. The rationale of the current method of 
setting electorate districts is to ensure a practical electorate-MP link, electorates 
of relative size, and a certain minimum representation for the South Island;213 
setting electorates in stone, or limiting the number of electorate seats would see 
the electorate-MP link and the equivalence of electorates decline over time. 
However, due to these rules, which see a gradual increase in the number of 
electorates, and the fact that the total number of list and electorate MPs are 
limited to 120, the ratio of electorate to list seats increases. As this ratio increases, 
it is more likely that an election will be disproportionate and that overhang seats 
will occur. 
There are a number of practical difficulties with remedying this solution. 
First, the sections relating to calculating the number of electoral districts are 
entrenched, and will therefore be difficult to change; 214 however, it is not 
recommended that these sections change, given that this would mean that 
electorates would become larger. Secondly, any increase in the number of MPs, 
the more desirable solution, is likely to cause public outcry.215 An increase in the 
total number of MPs as electorate seats increase, by allocating an equivalent 
number of list MPs as electorate MPs, is desirable as not only would this 
maintain effective proportionality and electorate-MP links, but as the population 
of New Zealand increases there will be more MPs available to cover all the 
213 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 151-152. 
214 Electoral Act 1993, ss 268(l)(c) and (d). 
215 Although considered opinion and submissions on this issue generally support the status quo 
rather then a reduction; MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 34-40; Joseph, above n 188, 469-
470. 
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duties MPs must. The Royal Commission, in 1986, prefen-ed 140 MPs for this 
reason, but recommended 120 to avoid a negative public reaction.216 Although a 
negative public reaction is a problem to be overcome, a greater threat is that 
caused by a collapse in public support and confidence in the electoral system and 
government due to declining proportionality and MPs who cannot carry out their 
· b 217 JO S. 
The Royal Commission saw this declining proportionality as a problem. 
It suggested that the numbers of MPs would need to be increased if the method 
of detennining electoral districts, which was essentially the same, and the total 
number of MPs were fixed. 218 The Royal Commission predicted this would need 
to happen around the tum of the century, now five years ago. However, rather 
than increasing the fixed total of MPs, changing the method for detem1ining the 
number of list seats to one where an equivalent number of list to the number of 
electorate seats is allocated, is more desirable.219 This is the better option as it 
allows for the gradual increase of MPs as population increases; this was done 
pre-MMP, and did not seem to inflame the public the way that an extraordinary 
increase does. This option also means that the ratio of electorate to list seats 
remains the same and does not increase as the population changes, only to fall 
again when proportionality gets too tight and the total number of MPs is 
increased. 
Party-hopping has continually inflamed the ire of parties and public since 
MMP was introduced. With the 2005 election resulting in a fine balance between 
parties, a single defection from a party supporting the government may ca·use the 
government to collapse. This may put party-hopping legislation back on the 
agenda. Legislation is not effective for dealing with this political situation; as 
was made apparent by New Zealand's experience with the Electoral (Integrity) 
216 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 126-129 (particularly 127); see also 
Ministry of Justice, above n 78, 34-38. 
217 Palmer, above n 7, 128. 
218 Compare Electoral Act 1993, ss 35 and 36, to Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 
above n 6, 126-129 and 151-152. The Royal Commission did provide for less South Island 
districts ( 15 instead of 16) and a greater allowance in the variance between districts ( I O per cent 
instead of 5 per cent). 
219 See Electoral Act 1993, s 191(7). 
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Amendment Act. Not only was it undesirable m principle and form, it was 
ineffective in achieving its stated aims. 
Legislation is not the appropriate method for resolving this political 
process; complex political decisions such as whether to 'hop' cannot be boiled 
down to a few simple (or even many complex) rules. How can a proscriptive rule 
decide whether an MP has moved on from the party, or whether the party has 
moved on from both its principles and the MP? Such situations should be 
resolved by the only group who can fairly and without bias answer that question, 
the electorate at a general election. The only realistic solution to party-hopping is 
a constitutional convention that requires that MPs who have unjustly 'hopped' to 
resign from Parliament; this will require development and acceptance by 
individual MPs. The development of a convention could be aided through 
accurate reporting of situations so that the public mood can be evaluated, and that 
when the electorate as a whole decides that the 'hop' was unjustified, the MP 
will not be re-elected. A repeat of the Integrity Act is to be avoided. 
1 Recommendations 
To summarise, the rules relating to electoral thresholds and detem1ination 
of electoral and list seats should be modified to enhance proportionality. Party-
hopping should remain non-regulated by rules, but better education of MPs and 
the public would help to ensure that abuse of party-hopping does not occur, and 
would facilitate the formation of a convention. The recommendations in relation 
?JO to the electoral thresholds are:--
• To retain the electorate threshold as in section 191(4)(b);221 
and 
• To change section 191(4)(a) to ensure that the Chief Electoral 
Officer disregards any party that "has not achieved a total 
220 See [V A l Electoral thresholds. 
221 Electoral Act 1993, s l91(4)(b). 
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number of party votes that is at least equal to the quota as 
determined by section 35(3)(b )";
222 or 
• If this recommendation is not accepted, the vote threshold in 
section 191(4)(a) should be lowered to the Royal 
Commission's recommended four per cent, and consideration 
should be given to a lower threshold, such as two per cent. 
The recommendations in relation to the detennination of electoral and list 
n3 seats are:--
• Retaining the current method for detem1ining electoral 
districts; 
• Allowing the total number of MPs to increase beyond 120; 
and 
• Maintaining a 1: 1 ratio between electorate and list seats. 
These recommendations could all be achieved by changing section 191 (7) 
to require the Chief Electoral Officer to ascertain "the highest number of quotients 
equal to twice the number of general and Maori constituency seats", thereby 
resulting in an equal allocation of lists seats as there are electorate seats. 
V CONCLUSION 
In order to realise an effective, principled and democratic MMP electoral 
system, the system as a whole must be based on clear and appropriate principles 
and be well structured. This extends beyond just the process of turning votes into 
seats, to include the actors and outcomes of elections. Our electoral system is 
based upon the principles of democracy, proportionality and accountability, and 
these must be reflected in the actors and outcomes of elections. 
In assessing electoral systems, focus is usually placed upon the processes 
within the system of turning votes into seats and the outcomes that result from 
such processes. Such analysis is useful and will show whether the system 
222 Electoral Act 1993, ss 191(4)(a) and 35(3)(b). 
223 See IV A 2 Declining proportionality and overhang seats. 
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respects its underlying principles. Actors, however, are often left out of the 
analysis. As it is actors to whom the electoral rules are applied, any degradation 
of the underlying principles inherent in the actors will carry through to the final 
outcome; such degradation may be overt, and the result will not reflect the 
principle, or more covert, where while seeming to conform to the principles, they 
are undermined. 
To ensure a robust electoral system we must ensure robust rules that 
produce principled outcomes, and ensure that those outcomes are not 
compromised by wayward actors. Under MMP the principled outcome 1s a 
democratically proportional one; the actors are political parties. Principles must 
not be prioritised to the exclusion of effective government, therefore an 
appropriate balance between principles and effective government must be found. 
This paper has examined the law relating to parties, and has found the law 
to be deficient. Presently little accountability of parties exists, and democracy 
and proportionality may be undermined by inappropriate party structures and 
decision making. Reforn1 of parties can be undertaken to improve accountability 
and ensure adherence to electoral principles. A three pronged attack changing 
party legal status, improving party decision making, and improving oversight of 
parties is recommended. 
A public legal status would bring public law checks over parties, 
including public law judicial review of the validity of party decision making, the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and increased access to infonnation through the 
Official Information Act; if this was combined with mandatory incorporation of 
parties this would create effective regulation of parties ensuring sound results 
and sufficient accountability without undermining the effectiveness of parties. 
Party decision making processes, particularly in regards to candidate 
selection, may be improved by setting out certain requirements to ensure the 
desired level of democratic input and maintain high quality and effective parties. 
This may be achieved by mandating an indicative method of candidate selection 
that may only be departed from under clear circumstances. Leaving the departure 
criteria up to parties allows party goals to prevail but will ensure that no breach 
of process occurs. 
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Oversight may be improved by increasing the powers of the Electoral 
Commission in regards to parties. The Electoral Commission should have the 
ability to review party selection processes and parties compliance with electoral 
rules, and be able to impose sanctions on wayward parties. By combining an 
improved Electoral Commission with a public status, mandatory incorporation 
and mandated selection processes an efficient system of party oversight and 
control can be exercised. This would not derogate from efficient parties. 
This three pronged approach essentially uses existing and effective law to 
create a robust regulation and oversight regime of parties. Parties have a vital 
constitutional role that presently is unregulated. The recommendations in this 
paper allow proper protection of the constitutional role of parties to ensure that 
abuse cannot occur but do not derogate from effective and unique parties. 
The rules relating to converting votes into seats have been examined. 
Two areas are less than ideal and may in the future undermine the principles 
MMP is based on. In particular the rules relating to electoral thresholds, which 
determine when an otherwise viable party will gain list seats, and the rules 
relating to setting electoral districts and the maximum number of MPs are 
unsatisfactory. While these areas do not in themselves abrogate the principles of 
MMP they have the potential to undermine the realisation of said principles. 
Electoral thresholds are currently set too high. This paper recommends 
that thresholds are lowered to a level which while avoiding a proliferation of 
minor or extremist parties that may undennine effective government, do allow 
emerging parties a chance in elections. Ideally a vote threshold set to the size of 
the electorate quota would achieve this, and is independently a justifiable level 
for election. However, if a percentage of the total vote cast is desired, the vote 
threshold should be lowered to at least the level recommended by the Royal 
Commission, four per cent, and consideration should be given to lowering to an 
even smaller threshold, two per cent, which would seem to be appropriate given 
the electoral history of MMP in New Zealand. 
The electorate threshold should be retained. While it is seen by some as 
unprincipled and anomalous, the effect of removing this threshold on effective 
government and proportionality is severe. Without the electorate threshold 
overhang seats are more likely to occur, which would further undem1ine 
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proportionality. If the vote threshold is changed to the electorate quota size as 
recommended, the electorate threshold is also far less anomalous; both thresholds 
would therefore require a party to show a sufficient level of national or local 
support in order to gain list seats. 
The rules relating to the determination of electoral districts and the 
maximum number of MPs will create a situation of declining proportionality. 
This can be remedied by allowing the gradual increase of the number of total 
MPs as the New Zealand population changes in size and distribution. Ideally the 
calculation of electoral districts, and therefore electorate seats, should remain the 
same, and an equivalent number of list seats should be allocated. This would 
solve the problem of declining proportionality and maintain a 1: 1 electorate to 
list seat ratio. 
Party-hopping has also been discussed as an example of the inappropriate 
use of legal rules to regulate political conduct. The use of legal rules in such a 
situation has serious impact on effective government. This shows the danger of 
prioritising the principles of MMP over the practical reality of government. 
New Zealand already has a robust MMP electoral system. Proportionality 
is better in New Zealand than almost anywhere else in the world; government has 
been stable and effective. There do remain a few areas that may present a 
problem in the future; if the rules of MMP are tightened up such a threat will be 
mitigated. The area where MMP is most threatened exists in the status and 
regulation of parties. Parties are the fundamental actor in government and 
elections. They have their fingers in every piece of the constitutional pie, but 
remain outside any checks and balances that other constitutional actors are 
subject to. Parties need to be brought within the scope of public law and be 
subject to its checks and balances. This is arguably the most difficult task facing 
constitutional reform in New Zealand; parties retain a stranglehold on the 
processes that would need to be used to rein them in. While the task of 
convincing parties to delegate some of their powers to the rule of law is an 
arduous one; the process must begin somewhere; this paper has hopefully 
provided a picture of an effective and principled electoral system that will 
resonate with electoral actors and set New Zealand on the road to reform. 
57 
VI APPENDIX ONE: THE SAINTE-LAGUE METHOD 
The actual allocation of seats is based on the Sainte-Lague method. 
224 
This involves taking the total party votes each party receives and dividing 
successively by odd numbers (i.e. 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11.. .) in order to produce a table. 
Seats are then allocated to each party; the party with the highest number gets the 
first seat, the second highest gets the second, and so on, until the total amount of 
seats, presently 120, has been allocated. This gives the total seats each party will 
receive, electorate and list. For example, the 2002 election (showing the first four 
divisions ): 225 
Table 2: The Sainte-Lague method in the 2002 New Zealand election (first four divisions) 
Labour 
Votes / 
1 
838219 (1) 
Votes / 
3 
279406 (3) 
Votes / 
: 5 
, 167644 (5) 
: Votes / 
7 
119746 (10) 
------------------ ____________________ ... ______________________ ... ______________________ , _________ _____________ _ 
National 
425310 (2) · 141 no (8) · 85062 (12) ; 60759 (16) 
' ' ' \,r~~------------ -iio9_1_i ___ <4>·--,- ;io:fr)4 ______ ci:.y -,·42i-82 ______ c2:.y --:- icii3_0 ______ cj2j __ _ 
Zealand 
First , , , :~~i::::::::::: : r4~t1t :: :c~>:::;: i~):~~:::::: i:~~>: :[ :?~9:( ~:::::: i~~>:: J: ~9:1?:~::::: :c ~~i ::: 
Green 142250 (7) ' 47417 (20) ' 28450 (35) · 20321 (48) 
Part)' , , , 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United 135918 (9) 45306 (22) 27184 (37) 19417 (51) 
Future 
Progressive 
Coalition 
34542 (28) 11514 (83) : 6908 (-) 4935 (-) 
The Progressive Coalition was entitled to two seats, numbers 28 and 83 of 120; 
as they had won one electorate seat, they received one list seat. 
There are vanous other methods for allocating seats in proportional 
electoral systems. The other major method, used in Gennany, is the d'Hondt 
method which instead of dividing by successive odd numbers, divides by 
successive numbers (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 . .. ). Still another uses a modified Sainte-
224 Electoral Act 1993, s 191. 
225 Electoral Commission, above n 160. 
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Lague method that replaces the initial divisor of one; 1.4 is used in Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark, three was proposed for New Zealand by the Royal 
Commission, although was not accepted. 226 
The method used has a significant impact of the resultant allocation of 
seats and the proportionality of Parliament. For example the d'Hondt method, 
and to a lesser extent the modified Sainte-Lague method, is biased towards 
allocating seats to larger parties than the pure Sainte-Lague method is; the pure 
Sainte-Lague method recognises that vote to seats differences have a greater 
impact on smaller parties than larger parties and is therefore effective in creating 
a significantly proportional result for all parties in an election. 227 
226 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 71-74. 
227 
Michael Gallagher "Proportionality, Disproportional ity and Electoral Systems" ( 1991) I 0 
Electoral Studies 33 ; Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 71-74. 
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VII APPENDIX TWO: THE GALLAGHER INDEX OF 
DISPROPORTIONAL/TY 
The disproportionality of an election, i.e. how far apart the percentage of 
seats a party receives is from the percentage of votes that party received, may be 
measured by reference to the Gallagher Index. The index gives a numerical value 
of disproportionality, the higher the value the higher the disproportionality 
caused by an election. The calculation involves taking the square root of half the 
sum of the squares of the differences between percent of vote received and 
percent of seats received for each party, graphically: 
228 
Figure 1: The Gallagher Index 
Where LSq (the least square) is the measure of disproportionality, V is the 
percentage of votes received, and S is the percentage of seats received. This will 
produce a number between O and l 00, 0 indicates perfect proportionality and l 00 
indicates that a party, or candidate, with no votes received a seat.
229 The index is 
useful for comparing the proportionality of different electoral systems, as well as 
the proportionality of results of individual elections. 
Applying the index to the results of recent elections in New Zealand gives 
the following table:230
 
Table 3: Disproportionality in New Zealand elections (1990 - 2005) 
Election 
(electoral 
system) 
1990 (FPP): 
228 Anckar, above n 30, 503. 
( Disproportionality 
16.65% 
229 Kenneth Benoit "Which Electoral Fonnula is the Most Proportional" (2000) 8 Political 
Analysis 381,383. 
230 Electoral Commission, above n 160. 
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1993 (FPP): 
1996 (MMP): 
1999 (MMP): 
2002 (MMP): 
2005 (MMP): 
18.29% 
4.50% 
3.15% 
2.56% 
1.13% 
As can be seen disproportionality was reduced dramatically with the introduction 
of MMP; in 1996 disproportionality was a less than a quarter of the 1993 level, 
and has been continuing to reduce in the following MMP elections. Comparing 
the index of recent elections around the world gives: 
Table 4: Disproportionality in recent elections worldwide 
Election j Disproportionality 
( electoral system) 
United Kingdom : 16.9% 
-~9_Q?_(~RfJ __________ j __________________________ _ 
Russia 2003 : 13.0% 
_ (~M2:~~ ~ _______________ I __________________________ _ 
South Korea 2004 : 12.2% 
_(~Mt _________________ ; __________________________ _ 
Wales 2003 : 12.03% 
_ {MMfJ _______________ j ______ ____ ________________ _ 
Canada 2004 : 10.0% 
(FPP): j 
-s~~ii~~<l- ------i'oo3 · 1 ·---------9 ~ i ooio----------
_ {MMf): _______________ j __________________________ _ 
Italy 2001 (MMP): j 8.08% 
India 2004 (FPP): j 5.4% 
---------------------------:---------------------------
European 5.0% 
Parliament 2004 : 
(PR-M):232 : __________________________ J __________________________ _ 
Germany 2002 ! 4.3% 
_ (~MfJ _______________ ! __________________________ _ 
23 1 Supplementary member (for example 50 percent of seats are elected by closed list proportional 
allocation, 50 percent of seats by first-past-the-post, the FPP election does not affect and is not 
affected by the PR election (contrast with MMP); Seat Allocation: Russia, 225 (FPP), 225 (PR), 
South Korea, 243 (FPP), 46 (PR)). 
232 Proportional representation within multiple multi-member constituencies using closed lists. 
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New Zealand 2002 2.56% 
(MMP\: ____ ___ __ } _________ __ ___ __ ------------ -- -------------
Netherlands 2002 1.0% 
(PR-S):233 
This shows that the proportional representation systems (MMP, PR) are less 
disproportionate than the systems that have a large component of majoritarian or 
plurity election (FPP, SM (these are at least 50 percent plurity / majoritarian), 
India being an exception. The New Zealand and German MMP systems perform 
reasonably well, and are only beaten by the absolutely proportional system of the 
Netherlands with no potentially distorting electoral thresholds. 
The high disproportionality of the MMP election in Wales is likely due to 
the poor implementation of the electoral system. In Wales 40 seats are electorate 
seats and only 20 are allocated to parties based on the party vote; a high ratio of 
electorate seats to list seats makes it less likely that disproportionate results in the 
plurity type electorate vote will be mitigated by the proportional allocation of 
seats according to the party vote. This increases the likelihood of overhang seats 
which further decreases proportionality. 
Scotland had a relatively high level of disproportionality, although it was 
still below the plurity and majoritarian systems. Scotland has 73 electorate seats 
and 56 list seats; this is actually a slightly better ratio of electorate to list seats 
than in New Zealand. The higher level of disproportionality in Scotland is due to 
the implementation of MMP. Scotland is divided into seven regions, each region 
has eight list seats and these are allocated to parties based on their proportion of 
the party vote within that region; this in effect means that there are seven multi-
member constituencies in addition to the plurity constituencies ( electorate seats). 
This system increases disproportionality as the more seats a constituency returns 
the greater the proportionality; any division in list constituencies will therefore 
increase disproportionality. A single national multi-member list constituency, 
such as is used for list seat allocation in New Zealand, is therefore the least 
disproportionate way of structuring MMP. 
234 
Italy also has high disproportionality, caused by the use of decoy lists. 
These allow parties to gain seats beyond their proportion of the party vote by 
233 Proportional representation, single constituency, no threshold for election. 
234 Benoit, above n 229, 385-386. 
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exploiting the rule that list seats plus electorate seats must equal the proportion of 
the party vote. By splitting candidates into a list party and an electorate party, 
and with voters splitting their votes between the two parties, the combined 
number of seats between the two parties can be much greater than the proportion 
of the party vote would entitle them to as the number of electorate seats won will 
not be subtracted from the list seat allocation.235 
235 Note that this issue is partially covered in New Zealand by the rules relating to component 
parties, however, it would still be possible to exploit this rule if the party was willing to take on 
the risk of losing electorate MPs; Electoral Act 1993, ss 63(2)(d), l 27(3A), 128A, & 191. 
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Vl/I APPENDIX THREE: SELECTED PARTY CONSTITUTIONS 
All registered parties must lodge copies of their current candidate selection rules 
with the Electoral Commission.236 These rules must be democratic procedures for 
candidate selection. 237 The actual rules relating to candidate selection differ 
markedly between parties. The constitutions of selected parties have been 
examined and the candidate selection processes are set out here. 
A The Green Party238 
The Green Party currently has the most pure democratic input into 
candidate selection by the wider party membership than any other party. The 
constitution allows for the selection processes to be determined by the party 
executive,239 this allows for relative ease of change of the selection processes. 
The rules set out the actual selection process.
24° Firstly, all the putative 
candidates are ranked by the Party Executive, to give all members an indicative 
ranking order based upon the views of those who have interacted with the 
putative candidates. This vote does not contribute to the final selection. Secondly, 
all current financial members of the Green Party rank the putative candidates that 
produces a final list allocated by single-transferable vote. Finally, the Candidate 
Selection and List Ranking Committee check the final list to ensure that it 
conforms to certain criteria and may recommended a change to the list order or 
candidate selection based upon those criteria. 
The criteria require that the list in particular must throughout contain:
241 
• a minimum of 10 percent Maori representation; 
• a maximum of 60 percent male or 60 percent female; 
• a minimum of 40 percent from the North Island, and a 
minimum of 20 percent from the South Island; and 
• a minimum of 10 percent aged under 40. 
236 Electoral Act 1993, s 718 . 
237 Electoral Act 1993, s 71. 
238 Green Party, above n 44. 
239 Green Party, above n 44, rule 10.1 . 
240 Green Party "Candidate Information" (February 2005). 
24 1 Green Party, above n 240, 2. 
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Candidates may only be moved a maximum of three places m the list order 
according to these criteria. 
These rules allow for relatively robust direct democratic involvement 
from the wider party membership. As the criteria for departure from the 
indicative final vote are promulgated before the vote this minimises the influence 
that the party elite may have on the final candidate selection. 
B The Labour Party242 
The Labour Party candidate selection process is based on selection by 
delegates of the wider party membership. There is therefore no direct democratic 
involvement by the wider party. The rules are contained in the constitution and 
therefore may only be changed at the annual party conference involving all party 
members. 243 
The selection process begins in the Regional Conferences who select 
putative candidates from previously nominated members. Each region selects a 
different number of candidates based on population distribution. 244 Regional 
Conferences must observe gender and ethnic balance in their selections or lose 
voting entitlement. 245 The Regional Conferences are made up of delegates from 
the region, and includes delegates from the Regional Council, electorate 
organisations, affiliates (trade union members), representatives from the New 
Zealand Council, and representatives from the Labour caucus.246 The delegates at 
each Regional Conference rank candidates using an STY vote, and must consider 
in so voting that the candidates are fairly balanced with respect to representation 
of Maori, women, men, and other ethnic groups, and are appropriate for the 
geographic spread of the population.247 
After the Regional Conferences have determined the electorate candidates, 
these candidates go to the Moderation Committee for consideration for the party 
242 Labour Party "New Zealand Labour Party Constitution and Rules". 
243 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 155. 
244 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 266. 
245 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 260. 
246 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 263 . 
247 Labour Party, above n 242, rules 266-267 . 
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list. 248 The Moderation Committee is comprised of members of the Party 
Executive, caucus, members of the Labour Maori Council , members of sector 
councils (which include women, pacific island, Young Labour, and union 
affiliates), and members from Regional Councils.
249 The Moderation Committee 
must have regard to representation from Maori, women, men, ethnic groups, 
people with disabilities, and regard to geographic spread, and skill of putative 
candidates when composing the final list.
250 The Moderation Committee can add 
candidates not selected through regional conferences to ensure due regard 1s 
. l C'. 25 1 Th M d . C . ' d . . . fi l 1 51 g1 ven to t 1ese tactors. e o eratton omm1ttee s ec1s10n 1s ma . - -
Candidate selection is highly regimented by the constitution; the criteria 
to be considered at each stage are strictly defined. It does not involve direct input 
by the wider party, but rather input is given by delegates elected by the wider 
party membership and delegates appointed by certain groups within the Labour 
Party. The Regional Conferences have final selection for the electorate 
candidates, while the Moderation Committee retains the final selection of list 
candidates. The Party Executive retains significant control over candidate 
selection, but is restrained by the criteria in the constitution. 
C The National Part/53 
The National Party candidate selection process is set out in the 
constitution and may therefore only be changed at the annual conference with 
input by the wider party membership.254
 
Electorate candidates can be selected by two alternative methods. Firstly, 
candidates are selected within the electorates by Electorate Committees, who are 
either appointed from committees within the National Party or elected by 
financial members within the electorate,255 acting under direction from the Party 
Executive and according to an STY vote by the Electorate Committee. 
256 
248 Labour Party, above n 242, rules 271-287. 
249 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 273. 
250 Labour Party, above n 242, rules 277 & 280. 
25 1 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 281 . 
252 Labour Party, above n 242, rule 282. 
253 National Party "Constitution and Rules of the New Zealand National Party" (May 2003). 
254 National Party, above n 253 , rule 25(b). 
255 National Party, above n 253, rule 64. 
256 National Party, above n 253 , rules 89 & 115 . 
66 
Alternatively, an electorate may undertake candidate selection by way of vote of 
all party members within the electorate. 257 Selected candidates are subject to 
rs approval by the Party Executive. ) 
All list candidates, apart from a maximum of five selected by the Party 
Executive, must be electorate candidates. 259 The Party Executive determines the 
size of the list. Candidates are ranked by preferential voting by Regional 
Forums. 260 These indicative lists are given to a List Ranking Committee, which 
comprises of the Party Executive and members of the National caucus, who then 
rank the nominees having regard to the Regional Forum lists; this list is finai. 26 1 
This process is relatively undefined. The electorate candidate selection 
process is undertaken usually by the Electorate Committee who do not have to 
have regard to any specified criteria. The list selection process is decided solely 
by the Party Executive only with reference to the indicative vote by the Regional 
Forums. There is little direct involvement by the wider party unless the 
'universal suffrage' option is exercised at the electorate level. 
D Other Parties 
United Future's candidate selection process is set out in the rules of the 
party,262 and is therefore able to be changed by the Party Executive. Candidate 
selection occurs by the Candidate Selection Committee, comprised of members 
appointed from Regional Councils and representatives of the Party Executive, 
first vetoing putative nominees from their electorate.263 All party members may 
then comment on the putative candidates, these comments are weighed up by the 
Candidate Selection Committee who then endorses a candidate to the Party 
Executive, who can accept or send an endorsement back to the Candidate 
Selection Committee for further consideration. 264 
List selection occurs by indicative vote of all party members. This 
indicative vote is then used by the List Selection Committee, which is comprised 
257 National Party, above n 253 , rule 116. 
258 National Party, above n 253, rules 93 & 96. 
259 National Party, above n 253 , rules 121 (b) & 127. 
260 National Party, above n 253 , rules 130-132. 
261 National Party, above n 253 , rule 133. 
262 United Future, above n 130, rules 16.1 & 19. 1.3. 
263 United Future " United Future New Zealand Party Rules" (December 2004) rule 1.9. 
264 United Future, above n 263 , rules 1.12-1.16. 
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of the Party Executive and the caucus leader and deputy leader, to compile the 
final list.265 
The Maori Party electorate candidate selection process occurs by hui of 
all financial members in the relevant electorate. If no consensus is achieved the 
Electorate Council, essential elected delegates, selects a candidate. List selection 
occurs by Electorate Councils ranking five candidates in an indicative vote, with 
the final list detennined by the Party Executive. 266 
The ACT Party determines electorate candidates by secret ballot of all 
party members within each electorate.267 There is an indicative vote method for 
list candidate selection. All party members may participate in an indicative vote, 
as does the Party Executive. The final list is determined by the Party Executive 
with regard to the two indicative votes.268 
265 United Future, above n 263, rules 2.19-2.21. 
266 Maori Party "Rules of the Maori Party" (December 2004) First Schedule. 
267 ACT Party, above n 130, rule 22. 
268 ACT Party, above n 130, rule 23. 
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IX APPENDIX FOUR: ELECTION RESULTS AND THRESHOLDS 
Electoral thresholds can cause quite a significant difference in the 
resultant allocation of seats. These tables examine the differences four different 
thresholds would have made on the 2005, 2002, and 1999 elections. 
The actual result was arrived at with a five percent of the party vote, or 
one electorate seat, threshold. The four percent or one electorate is similar, but 
with a lower party vote threshold; this threshold was examined as it was the 
threshold recommended by the Royal Commission.269 The four percent threshold 
by itself means a party will only be allocated list seats if they reach four percent 
of the party vote, winning an electorate would not entitle the party to any 
additional list seats. They would, however, retain the electorate seats won; this 
threshold was examined as it had significant support in the 200 l MMP review 
and shows the effect that no electorate threshold would have. 270 No threshold 
means a party would gain list seats in proportion to the party vote gained; there is 
still an effective threshold created by the application of the Sainte-Lague method, 
but no legal threshold exists. The two percent or one electorate threshold was 
chosen as this appears to be a popular vote threshold overseas. 
Table 5: Thresholds and the 2005 election271 
Actual 4% or 1 4% 2% or 1 No 
Result electorate threshold electorate Threshold 
Labour 50 50 54 50 50 
_( 1 J_. )c o/o )_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _____________ ~ ____ ____ _______ j __ __ ____________ ~ _______________ j _______________ _ 
National 48 : 48 : 51 : 48 : 47 
_O~_.J_o/oJ ____ ______________________ j _________________ j ________________ j ______ __________ j ______ _________ _ 
New Zealand 7 : 7 : 8 : 7 7 
_:f_its_~ {?_._~o/o)_ _______________ _____ -~ ____________ ___ i ______________ _ L ______________ ; _______________ _ 
Green Party 6 : 6 : 7 : 6 : 6 
_(~:~~!?) _ ----------- ----------------~ --------------_ j _ ---------------~ --------------_ j_ ---------------
Maori Party 3 (+ 1 : 3 (+ 1 : 4 overhang : 3 (+ 1 : 3 (+ l 
_\~~ !!_~0 ) _ _ ____ ______ -~~~_r-~~!)_gt __ j __ ?~~~~!}-~g)_~ __ j ________________ ( __ ?~~~1:!1:1~g)_~ _ J __ 9_"".~~~-~~g2 __ 
United Future 3* : 3* : 1 overhang : 3 : 3 
_(~: ?~!?) _ ----------- ----------------~ --------------_ j _ ---------------~ --------------_ j_ ---------------
-~~!_(~--~!~~ ----- -------~~-------~------?-~ ______ j __ t _?~~~~!}-~g--~--- ---?-~ ______ j _____ __ ? ___ ___ _ 
Progressive 1 * 1 * : 1 overhang : 1 * : 1 
_(~:~ ~!?) _ ----------- ----------------~ --------------_ j---------------_:_ ---------------j _ ---------------
269 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 6, 66-67. 
270 MMP Review Committee, above n 132, 47-50. 
271 (*) indicates that the party met the electorate threshold but not the vote threshold. 
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Table 6: Thresholds and the 2002 election 
Actual : 4% or 1 4% : 2% or 1 
Result : electorate : threshold : electorate 
No 
Threshol 
d 
Labour (41.3%) 52 : 52 : 53 : 52 : 49 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
National (20.9%) 27 : 27 : 27 : 27 : 25 -N~~-z~~i~-~d -Fi~s_t ____ ------ ij ------:------ i3------;------i3------;------13 _____ r _____ i_2 _____ _ 
_ o9:1_0(!' ) _____________ ---- ---------------1- --------------1- -------------- -1- ------------_) _ --------------
ACT (7.1 %) 9 : 9 : 9 : 9 : 9 
-c~~~~ -r~~ty -c1.-0°i~ j-- -------i/ -----T------9-------;- -----9------;-- -----9------r------8-------
-u~it~ct -F~t~-~~--------- _______ 8 ______ T ______ 8 _______ f ______ 9 __ __ __ , _______ s ______ r- _____ 8 ______ _ 
_(~:7~".«!l ________________________________ ) _______________ ( _____________________________ )_ _____________ _ 
Progressive (1. 7%) 2* : 2* : 1 2* : 2 
: : overhang : 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Christian Heritage O : 0 : 0 0 : 2 
(14%) : : : 
- - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _t_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - J_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-~t_J_t~?~~-~~~_Q}_~o) __ _______ Q _______ \ _______ Q _______ [ ______ Q ______ j _______ Q ______ j _______ ? ______ _ 
Alliance (1.3%) 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 2 -A~t~;;~~-~ i-~g;.-,-is~ -----------o-------!- ------o-------;- -----o------;- -----a------r------i-------
Cannabis (.6%) : : : : 
Table 7: Thresholds and the 1999 election 
Actual 4% or 1 4% 2% or 1 No 
Result electorate threshold electorate : Threshold 
Labour (38.7%) 49 : 49 : 50 : 48 : 48 -N ~ti~~~i-(Jo.s0io_)_ --- ------39------:- -----jcj ------:- -----39------·:-----_ 3_8 _ -----:- -----j 7------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -L - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - -'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - J - - _____________ L ______________ _ 
-~-'J!~-~~~-F·?~0) _ ___ __ ______ ! ~-____ -~ _____ -~ 9 _______ ! ______ -~ Q ______ j ______ J_Q ____ __ l______ J ______ _ 
-~<;:-~_Q_.~~o) ___ ___ __ _ _______ ? _______ ~ ______ 9- ______ ) _______ ? _______ ) _______ ? __ _____ [ ______ J ______ _ 
Green Party 7 : 7 : 7 : 6 : 6 
_(~:~ ~".«!l _ --------------- --------------_ \_ -------------_ )_ --------------_j _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ j_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
New Zealand First 5* : 5 : 5 : 5 : 5 
_( ~:~ ~".«!l _ --------------- ---------------~ --------------_:_ --------------; _ --------------~ ---------------
Christian Heritage O : 0 : 0 : 3 : 3 
_(~:1 ~".«!l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________ -~ _______________ : _______________ j ___________ ____ ~ ______________ _ 
Future (1.1 %) 0 : 0 : 0 : 0 : 1 X~t~;;~~;; i-~g~-,-isi---------o-------f- -----o------T------o-------;- ------o- ------f- ------i- ---- --
_r~!l-~?_l?J~_ (!:!_o(? )_ --- --------------_:_ --------------_:_ ------------ --_: _ -------------_ :_ ---------------
United NZ (.5%) 1 * \ 1 * : 1 j 1 * i 1 
: ; overhang : i 
The effect of electoral thresholds on disproportionality can also be seen. 
No electoral threshold consistently produces the most proportional result, while 
abolishing the electorate threshold consistently produces the most 
disproportionate result. A two percent vote threshold or one electorate seat is an 
70 
improvement on disproportionality for the 1999 election. This is because no 
thresholds means that only votes received by parties that fall below the effective 
threshold of applying the Sainte-Lague method are not counted; no electorate 
threshold means that votes given to parties that received an electorate seat, but 
not enough of the party vote to qualify for list seat allocation, are not counted; 
there has also consistently been overhang seats with no electorate threshold. 
Table 8: Thresholds and disproportionality 
Actual 4% or 1 4% 2% or 1 No 
Result electorate threshold electorate Threshold 
2005 1.13% 1.13% 2.15% 1.13% 0.99% 
Election ----------------- ---------------- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- -----------------2002 2.56% 2.56% 2.82% 2.56% 0.78% 
Election ----------------- --- ------- --- --- ----------------- ---------------- ---------------- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1999 3.15% 3.15% 3.24% 2.03% 1.48% 
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